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Abstracts 
Cross selling is the practice of selling additional products to an existing 
customer. It has the potential to boost revenues and can be beneficial for 
both the company and the customer. For many multi-divisional companies 
with product or service oriented organizational structures the attempt to 
realize the benefits of cross selling generates incentive problems. In this 
thesis, three problems spread over three business levels are identified. 
Firstly, management needs to (financially) motivate business units in 
fostering their cross selling efforts. Secondly, in order to make cross 
selling happen, business units need to cooperate and to exchange 
product-related information. Finally, in order to increase their short-term 
benefits business units might act opportunistically by selling products or 
services of other business units without paying attention to adding value 
for their customers. These incentive problems are theoretically examined 
by applying principal-agent theory and the theory of repeated games. Our 
findings suggest that an optimized incentive structure is required to make 
both the business units and the management better off. The thesis also 
analyses the circumstances and necessary prerequisites under which cross 
selling initiatives are beneficial for all involved parties. Apart from that 
cross selling sometimes may turn out to be non-beneficial. In addition to 
the elaborations above, risks and hazards of cross selling are presented in 
detail and applied for the extension of the underlying model. Bottom line, 
the work underlines that cross selling is to be realized holistically to 
ensure durable success. 
Keywords: cross selling, incentives, incentive problems, profit-sharing, 
business unit, key account, management, cross-divisional, multi-divisional 
companies, relationship of trust, exploiting, principal-agent theory, 
repeated prisoner's dilemma, repeated trust game. 
 
Cross-Selling ist der Verkauf ergänzender Produkte an einen bestehenden 
Kunden. Das Ziel dieser Vertriebsstrategie ist den Unternehmensumsatz 
zu steigern. Cross-Selling kann für beide Parteien, Unternehmen und 
Kunden, profitabel sein. Für viele Unternehmen, die in Geschäftsbereiche 
gegliedert sind und eine Produkt- oder Service-orientierte 
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Organisationsstruktur verfolgen, kann das Ausführen von Cross-Selling zu 
Anreizproblemen führen. In dieser Arbeit werden drei Probleme auf drei 
verschiedenen Geschäftsebenen identifiziert. Erstens, die Geschäftsleitung 
muss die Geschäftsbereiche (finanziell) inzentiveren, um diese zu 
motivieren Cross-Selling durchführen. Zweitens, Cross-Selling kann nur 
dann effizient durchgeführt werden, wenn die Geschäftsbereiche 
kooperieren und benötigte Produktinformationen untereinander 
austauschen. Drittens, es besteht die Gefahr, dass die Geschäftsbereiche 
opportunistisch handeln, um ihren kurzfristigen Nutzen zu steigern, indem 
sie das Vertrauensverhältnis zu ihrem Key Account dazu verwenden, 
ergänzende Produkte zu verkaufen ohne dem Kunden einen Mehrwert zu 
verschaffen. Diese Anreizprobleme werden mit der Prinzipal-Agenten-
Theorie und der Theorie wiederholter Spiele untersucht. Die Ergebnisse 
der Arbeit zeigen auf, dass eine optimale Anreizstruktur erforderlich ist, 
um Cross-Selling effizient auszuführen. Des Weiteren werden die 
Bedingungen analysiert, die eingehalten werden sollten, damit alle 
beteiligten Parteien von Cross-Selling profitieren. Unter gewissen 
Bedingungen kann Cross-Selling jedoch auch nachteilig wirken. Zusätzlich 
zu den oben genannten Aspekten werden die Risiken und Gefahren des 
Cross-Sellings detailliert herausgearbeitet und basierend darauf das 
zugrunde liegende Model erweitert. Die finale Analyse zeigt, dass Cross-
Selling ganzheitlich betrachtet werden sollte, um dauerhaften Erfolg zu 
verzeichnen. 
Schlüsselwörter: Cross-Selling, Querverkauf, Anreize, Anreizprobleme, 
Gewinnbeteiligung, Geschäftsbereich, Key Account, Schlüsselkunden, 
Geschäftsleitung, Geschäftsfelder, Geschäftsebenen, Vertrauensverhältnis, 
Ausbeutung, Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie, Spieltheorie, wiederholtes 
Gefangenendilemma, wiederholtes Vertrauensspiel. 
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1 Introduction 
One day Deng Xiaoping decided to take his grandson to visit Mao. 
“Call me granduncle,” Mao offered warmly. “Oh, I certainly couldn't do that, 
Chairman Mao,” the awestruck child replied. “Why don't you give him an 
apple?” suggested Deng. No sooner had Mao done so than the boy happily 
chirped, “Oh thank you, Granduncle.” “You see,” said Deng, “what incentives 
can achieve." (Capitalism 1984) 
 
Cross selling is the execution of selling additional products, product 
lines or services to existing clients. The goals are to expand business with key 
accounts, to boost total revenue and profit per customer, to facilitate larger 
transactions and to ensure that the synergy possibilities are fully utilized. 
(Kamakura et al. 2003, Liu and Cai 2007, Kamakura 2008, Vyas 2008). As an 
alternative of investing significant assets, resources and money to desperately 
enlarge the company's footprint and customer base, many enterprises consider 
their current customer and their further profit and growth potential much more 
precise – this means fewer expenses to acquire new customers and low levels 
of risk, because customer profiles are already known (Hartline et al. 2000). 
The practice of cross selling is very popular in the domain of financial 
services, especially in the banking industry. With an average of 5.9 products 
per customer, the retail banking business at Wells Fargo is certainly an 
outstanding example (Forbes Magazine 2012) and since Morgan Stanley was 
hurt in the past by investing in property and hedge funds, cross selling is the 
way forward for them. Morgan Stanley offers “a full suite of services ranging 
from takeover advice to derivatives structuring and securities trading” (The 
New York Times 2010). In Europe, Deutsche Bank seeks to position its wealth 
management closer to its investment banking, thus seeking to foster cross 
selling (Financial Times 2012a). Everyday examples of cross selling initiatives 
include a well-known fast food chain’s practice of suggesting that their 
customers upgrade their meal purchase into 'value meals' or online retailer 
Amazon’s recent acquisition of the James Bond novel distribution rights; by 
linking James Bond merchandise, movies and soundtracks to the novels, 
Amazon aims to boost its cross selling revenue (Financial Times 2012b). Cross 
selling is also present in the media sector, as represented by Virgin, which 
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carries out cross selling to remain revenue steady (Financial Times 2012c) and 
within the automotive industry, dealers do not just sell cars; in addition, they 
capitalize on their cross selling potential by offering associated insurances 
through their financial business field. This means that the sale of financial 
products generates new business and profits (Thomas et al. 2004). Therefore, 
cross selling efforts may result in higher conversion ratios, build up and 
leverage of the business’ relationship with their clients and thus deter 
competition by decreasing the chance of their customers switching to a 
competitor (Sonnenberg 1988, Crosby et al. 1990, Srivastava et al. 1999, 
Kamakura et al. 2003, Akçura and Srinivasan 2005, Liu and Cai 2007). Such 
efforts can create loyal and, in many cases, more profitable customer 
relationships (Narver and Slater 1990, Kalwani and Narayandas 1995, Kumar 
1999, Reinartz and Kumar 2000). 
The potential benefits of cross selling for both buyers and sellers are 
well documented in the relevant literature (Treacy and Wiersema 1995, 
Sonnenberg 1988, Vyas and Math 2006) and also confirmed by many 
practitioners, especially in a business-to-consumer (B2C) marketing context. 
Despite this background, there is remarkably little research about the incentive 
structures required for organizations, who wish to increase their cross selling 
efforts across their business divisions. In particular, multi-product companies 
which are organized into business units, with each unit being responsible for a 
distinctive product or product line, are inevitably confronted with the decision 
about how to shape the incentives across business units in order to initiate 
cross selling efficiently. In a business-to-business (B2B) environment consider, 
for example, a logistics company, with business units responsible for different 
transportation modes (sea, air, road, etc.), who wants to stimulate add-on 
business across several transport modes. Another typical example is auditing 
firms which have started to offer their clients service bundles, including M&A 
consultancy, financial and commercial services or operational due diligences 
services. In both cases, the business units have typically established long-term 
relationships with their primary commercial clients and the corporate 
management’s desire to foster cross selling across these business units requires 
careful consideration. 
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1.1 Rationales to Instruct Cross Selling 
Cross selling offers benefits to both buyer and seller. The buyer uses 
time and effort more efficiently by simplifying the procurement process and 
reducing the number of suppliers (one-stop shopping) and also by collaborating 
with someone who is already informed on the needs and requirements of the 
organization (Kamakura 2008, Vyas and Math 2006, Vyas 2008). The buyer 
benefits from extended product offerings and the enlarged portfolio of the 
supplier by procuring goods from a single or small number of vendor(s); a 
reduction of the companies the buyer purchases from takes place. Thereby 
complexity will be simplified, buying processes become more efficient and 
stronger collaborations between a few suppliers can be established and 
strengthened more easily (Homburg and Kuester 2001). Enlarged portfolios of 
the suppliers allow companies to concentrate on their preferred and selected 
suppliers (Homburg and Kuester, 2001). On the one hand, the threat of being 
disappointed by the supplier diminishes; on the other hand, the dependency on 
selected sellers could increase. The seller, who probably would have invest time 
and money to acquire new customers and to build up additional outside 
business, can instead focus on servicing the account and expanding the 
business with their current customer base (Sonnenberg 1988, Crosby et al. 
1990, Srivastava et al. 1999, Treacy and Wiersema 1995, Kamakura et al. 
2003, Akçura and Srinivasan 2005, Liu and Cai 2007, Kamakura 2008, Vyas 
and Math 2006, Vyas 2008). Essentially, buyer and seller profit from the 
savings inherent in transaction costs and overall synergy effects (summarized 
by table 1). 
 
Table 1: Benefits of cross selling (Vyas and Math 2006) 
Buyer Seller
One stop shopping Increasing revenue per 
customer
More customized service Reducing competition
Savings in transaction 
costs
Savings in transaction 
costs
Synergy effects Synergy effects
Decreasing acquisition 
expenses
Economies of scope
Benefits of cross selling
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Cross-selling aspires to recommend and sell clients further goods from various 
business units. In order to achieve this, the company has to identify and 
disclose subconscious customer pain points and requirements. These revealed 
needs have to be met by providing bundled products which are sold as holistic 
solutions by the different business units (Schäfer 2002). 
Many studies prove that it is easier for enterprises to grow by selling 
supplementary products to existing customers than by attracting new 
customers. Felvey (1982) shows this by studying bank marketing. Liu and Cai 
(2007) highlight findings which show the cost of acquiring a new client is five 
times that of keeping an existing customer, and the earnings realized by 
winning over ten new customers cannot equalize the outlay of losing an 
important customer. These findings were verified by Verhoef and Donkers 
(2001). They examined the significance of effective customer relations 
management in predicting potential consumer value for the insurance industry. 
In the literature, these findings are also used conversely. Rothfeder (2003) 
states that “there is a belief that it costs five times less to serve an existing 
customer than acquire a new one”. An additional reason to introduce cross 
selling, is that its tracked response rate is two to five times higher than cold 
sales, whereas simultaneously increasing customer retention by holding 
customers dynamically in the loop (Andrews 1999). During their research, the 
authors Homburg and Schäfer (2000) observe, that companies using increased 
effort in cross selling are significantly more profitable than companies which 
invest less in this method of sale. This is valid for companies that belong to the 
manufacturing sector as well as the service sector. Schäfer (2002), surprisingly, 
determined in his research that despite all of the listed benefits, many 
companies, especially in B2B markets, are not yet able to capitalize their 
accessible cross selling potential. 
Cultural diversity, human capability and the issue of coordination 
might often take a critical role, but the major key to a successful cross-selling 
system is to set incentives accurately. Cross selling works, if a sales person has 
the same or an even higher incentive to sell products of another business unit 
rather than the products of their own unit (Homburg and Jensen 2007). 
According to this, the incentive must be higher if the sale of the unfamiliar 
product requires more effort than the sale of their own product. Otherwise, 
executing cross selling would be irrational for the sales person. Successful cross 
selling is driven by having company-wide and cross-departmental incentives in 
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Lastly, the thesis proposes to derive managerial implications and to 
introduce appropriate recommendations regarding the benefits of cross selling 
initiatives for all involved parties. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 1 introduced cross selling 
and its entrepreneurial importance and concluded by determining the purpose 
of the work. The next section outlines the state of the art of economic analyses 
in the marketing research field, focusing on the subfield cross selling. The basic 
premise for the third to the fifth section is that cross selling is intrinsically 
beneficial. In the third section of the thesis, the conceptual modeling framework 
of the study is introduced by describing incentive problems related to cross 
selling initiatives arising at three organizational levels. In addition, the methods 
that are used to examine the research question of the thesis will be introduced. 
Section 4 explores the implications of the model for deriving optimal incentive 
structures to foster cross selling and to ensure a long-term collaboration among 
the business units and their key accounts. The fifth section summarizes our 
analytical results, generates the associated managerial implications and works 
out the limitations of the present model. 
Notwithstanding the given research results that the advantages of 
cross selling outweigh the disadvantages, it is worthwhile emphasizing the 
negative sides of cross selling as well. By doing this, concluding 
recommendations get more tangible. This said, in sections six to nine, it is 
assumed that cross selling may turn out to be non-beneficial. In Section 6 we 
compile a literature review focusing on critical studies of cross selling. With this 
knowledge, Section 7 adjusts the conceptual model of Section 3 by considering 
the carved out risks and inefficiencies of cross selling. In the eighth section, the 
analysis of section four will be adjusted accordingly. Section 9 outlines 
directions for future research. 
The thesis concludes with the overall observation that cross selling is 
to be realized holistically. In Section 10, further prerequisites, which need to be 
considered to implement cross selling most effectively, are listed. The thesis is 
concluded with a discussion of managerial recommendations, in Section 11. 
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2 State of the Art 
The evaluation of research literature regarding cross selling in general 
is out of scope. The relevancy and benefits of cross selling were briefly 
discussed in the first section. In scope is the state of the art of economic 
analyses in marketing; in particular with regard to the marketing sales 
strategy: cross selling. 
2.1 Economic Analyses in Marketing 
Within the research field of Marketing, economic analyses are 
occasionally used to construct sales strategies, sales compensation plans or 
seller-buyer situations. 
The strategy of using 'Sale' signs is examined by Anderson and 
Simester (1998). To outline the impact (growing demand) of the signs the 
authors applied a formal game-theoretic model. In this model, the competing 
stores sell imperfect substitutes. In scope are two-periods wherein the seasons 
intersect. The main reason for an increase in demand is the credible 
information that is given to the customer by using 'Sale' signs. Against 
managerial wisdom and academic theory Anderson (2002) proves, with the 
help of the Hotelling model that, within the business-to-consumer sector, 
treating the customers as partners is not the undisputed advisable solution. The 
results are derived by illustrating and comparing the monopoly and duopoly 
case while excluding costless negotiations. 
Establishing compensation plans with a suitable degree of incentives is 
a central task that sales force managers face. Lo et al. (2011) take into 
consideration two crucial issues: firstly, the selection problem (find the right 
salespeople) and secondly, the moral hazard problem (define the right level of 
incentives). The authors use an agency model to solve the issues and then test 
the theoretical framework by making use of individual-level compensation data 
for industrial salespeople. The literature review confirms that optimal salesforce 
compensation plans are occasionally resolved by using agency theoretical 
frameworks (Lal and Staelin 1986, Joseph and Thevaranjan 1998). 
Esmaeili et al. (2009) model the seller–buyer supply chain by applying 
non-cooperative and cooperative games. The authors explore the issues of the 
seller-buyer relationship which occur when the seller fabricates a product and 
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wholesales it to the buyer. The exploration is made by taking into account the 
sales price and marketing expenses. The problems are approached separately 
and as interactive games. In their research, Neslin and Greenhalgh (1986) only 
illustrate the theory of cooperative games to forecast the outputs of buyer-
seller negotiations. In the work of Lal and Narasimham (1996), the inverse 
relationship between the seller (manufacturer) and buyer (retailer) margins is 
described. By establishing an analytical framework and deploying game theory, 
the authors illustrate why margins can develop in a completely different course 
than expected and also explain why retailers achieve higher margins on 
products, which are not advertised and lower margins on products, which are 
promoted and marketed  
The literature studied regarding economic analyses in the research 
field sales is compiled in table 2. 
Author(s) Year, 
Title, Journal 
Abstract (part of) 
Anderson and 
Simester 1998, The 
Role of Sale Signs, 
Marketing Science 
"Sale signs increase demand. The apparent 
effectiveness of this simple strategy is surprising; sale 
signs are inexpensive to produce and stores generally 
make no commitment when using them. […].” The 
authors “offer an explanation for the effectiveness of 
sale signs […]. This explanation raises two additional 
issues. First, why do stores prefer to place sale signs on 
products that are truly low priced (stores could use sale 
signs to increase demand for any of their products)? 
Second, how many sale signs should a store use; 
should they limit sale signs to just their relatively low 
priced products or should they also place them on some 
of their higher priced products?” 
Anderson 2002, 
Sharing the Wealth: 
When Should Firms 
Treat Customers as 
Partners?, 
Management Science 
“Marketers often stress the importance of treating 
customers as partners. […]. For marketing managers, 
this implies organizing marketing activities in a manner 
that maximizes total surplus. This logic is theoretically 
sound when agreements between partners are limitless 
and costless. In most consumer marketing contexts 
(business-to-consumer), this is typically not true. […].” 
In this paper, the author uses “the example of a firm’s 
choice of product configuration to demonstrate two 
effects.” First, he shows “that a firm may configure a 
product in a manner that reduces total surplus but 
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increases firm profits. Second, one might conjecture 
that increased competition would eliminate this effect,” 
but the author shows “that in a duopoly firm profits 
may be increasing in the cost of product completion. 
[…]. Both results violate a fundamental premise of 
partnering – that firms and consumers should work 
together to increase total surplus and reach Pareto-
efficient agreements.” 
Lo et al. 2011, The 
Incentive and 
Selection Roles of 
Sales Force 
Compensation 
Contracts, Journal of 
Marketing Research 
“The authors use data on individual salesperson 
compensation contracts to show that firms design their 
pay plans to both discriminatingly select (i.e. attract 
and retain) salespeople and provide them with the right 
level of incentives. Consistent with standard agency 
arguments, the authors find that firms use higher-
powered incentives as the importance of agent effort 
increases. At the same time, the authors find strong 
support for the selection role of these contracts.” 
Lal and Staelin 1986, 
Salesforce 
Compensation Plans 
in Environments with 
Asymmetric 
Information, 
Marketing Science 
“In this paper”, the authors “present a theory of 
salesforce compensation plans to provide insights into 
why it may be advantageous for a profit maximizing 
firm to offer members of its salesforce the opportunity 
to choose from a menu of compensation plans. […]. In 
this paper”, the authors “relax the assumptions of 
information symmetry and salesforce homogeneity and 
show the conditions under which it is optimal to offer a 
menu of compensation plans.” 
Joseph and 
Thevaranjan 1998, 
Monitoring and 
Incentives in Sales 
Organizations: An 
Agency-Theoretic 
Perspective, 
Marketing Science 
The “primary objective in this paper is to analyze a 
framework that simultaneously examines the role of 
both monitoring and incentives in the design of sales 
force control systems.” The authors “analyze an 
agency-theoretic model in which a salesperson 
generates wealth for the firm by expending effort 
across two dimensions, namely, internal and external.” 
It is assumed “that effort in the internal dimension can 
be monitored relatively cheaply whereas effort in the 
external dimension can be monitored only at infinite 
cost.” The “analysis across the two scenarios helps […] 
to demonstrate the implications and value of 
introducing monitoring into the control structure.” 
Esmaeili et al. 2009, 
A game theory 
approach in seller–
buyer supply chain, 
European Journal of 
“In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain 
models are proposed which incorporate both cost 
factors as well as elements of competition and 
cooperation between seller and buyer. […]. The 
relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled 
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Operational Research by non-cooperative and cooperative games, 
respectively. The non-cooperative game is based on the 
Stackelberg strategy solution concept […]. Pareto 
efficient solutions will be provided for the cooperative 
game model. Numerical examples presented in this 
paper, including sensitivity analysis of some key 
parameters, will compare the results between different 
models considered.” 
Neslin and 
Greenhalgh 1986, The 
Ability of Nash's 
Theory of Cooperative 
Games to Predict the 
Outcomes of Buyer-
Seller Negotiations: A 
Dyad-Level Test, 
Management Science 
“This research develops and implements a dyad-level 
procedure for testing whether the outcomes of buyer-
seller negotiations correspond to settlements prescribed 
by Nash's theory of cooperative games. The procedure 
entails a multivariate statistical test in which some 
parameters are estimated by simulation, while others 
are provided directly from the assessment of negotiator 
utility functions by means of conjoint analysis. The 
procedure is applied to an experiment in which subjects 
participated in a realistic role-playing exercise that 
replicated the purchase of television advertising time.” 
Lal and Narasimham 
1996, The Inverse 
Relationship between 
Manufacturer and 
Retailer Margins: A 
Theory, Marketing 
Science 
The “objective in this paper is to explain the 
relationship between a manufacturer's brand 
advertising and its impact on wholesale and retail 
margins in consumer goods markets”. The authors 
“construct a model of retailers and manufacturers, and 
using tools from game theory explain why under some 
conditions a manufacturer's advertising can squeeze, 
i.e. lower, the retail margin while simultaneously 
increasing the wholesale margin”. The “paper should be 
of interest to applied analytical and empirical 
researchers in marketing as well as managers 
interested in understanding the strategic impact of 
brand advertising on margins”. 
Table 2: Economic analyses in sales 
Deriving optimal incentive mechanisms is also an essential element of 
studies on intra-group cooperation, intra-firm competition and mergers 
(Wickelgren 2005, Ziss 2007, Janus and Lim 2009). For example, to highlight 
one study: Janus and Lim (2009) bring in two separate incentive machineries. 
As a conclusion, the authors' concepts facilitate dynamic intra-group 
cooperation by applying the game 'Prisoner's Dilemma'. The article concludes 
that joint punishments ensure that collaboration is the preferred strategy within 
a dynamic environment. 
Optimal Incentives to Foster Cross Selling: An Economic Analysis 12 
 
 
Game theory is a common economic instrument to analyze problems 
in marketing. The strength of game theory is that it facilitates the analysis of 
situations, where decision makers are in strategic interdependence with each 
other. In marketing, these interdependences or interactions are apparent in the 
relationship between seller and buyer, following the intention to reduce 
asymmetric information (Kaas 1990, 1991). Further cases appear when 
focusing on interactions between competitors, e.g. in models of positioning and 
price competition (Roth 1999, 2000, Huber 1999). Moorthy (1985) uses game 
theory to model competition between advertising, product and price. The 
disadvantage of the use of game theory is that underlying assumptions, e.g. 
perfectly rational acting players or the uniqueness of equilibriums, do not allow 
a more realistic modeling. Therefore, Roth (2003) shows that evolutionary 
game theory requires less restrictive assumptions. Thus, by applying 
evolutionary game theory, the model gains in realism. The first researchers 
who made use of this approach in marketing were Homburg et al. (2013). The 
authors utilize evolutionary game theory to tackle the question: how classical 
companies are able to defend their market share against actual and future 
competitors. 
2.2 Economic Analyses in Cross Selling 
Most of the research studies regarding cross selling strategy are 
managerially rather than theoretically oriented (Kiefte 1995). Mundt et al. 
(2006) underlines that “more research is urgently needed” on cross-selling. 
This statement is still valid. 
There are numerous studies which underline the importance of cross 
selling practices, their benefits to companies and the necessity to satisfy 
customers’ needs (e.g. Sonnenberg 1988, Jarrar and Neely 2002, Harding et al. 
2004). However, only a few studies focus on theory and approach the cross 
selling phenomenon by economic and/or analytical studies (Guiltinan 1987, 
Kamakura et al. 2003, Akçura and Srinivasan 2005). Kamakura (2008) 
evaluates some of the analytical tools to disclose the capabilities for cross 
selling. Other papers offer advice on cross selling models, which can forecast 
customers' buying decisions, classify the best opportunities for a fresh offer in 
one of various divisions and determine the value of customer maturity and 
product grade (Kamakura et al. 2004, Liu and Cai 2007). Li et al. (2011) 
presents cross selling initiatives as solutions to a stochastic dynamic 
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programming issue. The authors present the optimal cross selling strategies 
regarding the right product to the right customer at the right time using the 
right communication channel. The findings of the economic and/or analytical 
studies that explore cross selling are summarized in table 3. 
Author(s) Year, 
Title, Journal 
Abstract (part of) 
Guiltinan 1987, The 
Price Bundling of 
Services: A Normative 
Framework, Journal of 
Marketing 
“As product lines have broadened in many industries, 
the use of mixed price bundling has increased. In mixed 
price bundling, a firm offers its customers the choice of 
buying one or more products/services individually or of 
buying a 'bundle' of two or more products or services at 
a special discount. The author presents a normative 
framework for selecting appropriate types of services 
for different mixed-bundling discount forms.” 
Kamakura et al. 2003, 
Cross-Selling through 
database marketing, 
Internat. J. Res. 
Marketing 
“An important aspect of the new orientation on 
customer relationship marketing is the use of customer 
transaction databases for the cross-selling of new 
services and products.” “In this study”, the authors 
“propose a mixed data factor analyzer that combines 
information from a survey with data from the customer 
database on service usage and transaction volume, to 
make probabilistic predictions of ownership of services 
with the service provider and with competitors”. 
Akçura and Srinivasan 
2005, Research Note: 
Customer Intimacy 
and Cross-Selling 
Strategy, 
Management Science 
Customer information “can help firms increase their 
profits through cross-selling opportunities. However, 
revealing personal preferences and contact information 
can raise the risks for customers when dealing with a 
firm. Consequently, some customers trade off the 
benefit and risks of revealing information. As the 
opportunity to obtain a higher level of information 
increases, customers incur a higher level of risk when 
dealing with a firm. This increases the firm’s incentive 
to commit on a cross selling level. By such a 
commitment, a firm can obtain customer intimacy and 
benefit from detailed customer information. As a result, 
profits increase while prices decrease. Thus, legal 
regulations that explicitly require firms to spell out the 
extent of cross-selling may actually improve the profits 
of the firm.” 
Kamakura 2008, 
Cross-Selling: 
“This article starts with a discussion of the benefits and 
pitfalls of cross-selling as a strategy for customer 
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Offering the Right 
Product to the Right 
Customer at the Right 
Time, Journal of 
Relationship 
Marketing 
development within the context of CRM, oriented 
towards increasing the firm's share of the customer 
wallet, broadening the scope of the relationship with 
the customer, and increasing customer retention. This 
discussion is followed by a review of some of the 
analytical tools for identifying prospects for cross-
selling, and by a discussion of technological and 
organizational requirements for the successful 
implementation of cross-selling.” 
Kamakura et al. 2004, 
Identifying innovators 
for the cross-selling of 
new products, 
Management Science 
“With recent advances in information technology, most 
companies are amassing extensive customer 
databases. The wealth of information in these 
databases can be useful in identifying those customers 
most likely to purchase a new product and in predicting 
when this adoption may take place. […].” The authors 
“propose a model that considers the timing of past 
purchases across multiple product categories and 
produces estimates of each customer’s propensity of 
ever purchasing in a particular product category and of 
the timing of their purchases. The model is designed to 
help managers identify the best prospects for a new 
offer in one of multiple categories based on 
generalizations obtained from past offers.” 
Liu and Cai 2007, 
Customer Cross-
Selling Model Based 
on Customer Maturity 
and Product Grade, 
International 
Management Review 
It is often observed that “consumers sequentially 
purchasing multiple products and services from the 
same provider. […]”. “In this paper”, the authors 
“propose a cross-selling model that can predict 
customers' purchase decisions among all of the 
available products and services based on the Counter 
Propagation Network (CPN). […]”. The authors provide 
“a new method to calculate the value of customer 
maturity and product grade”. 
Li et al. 2011, Cross-
Selling the right 
Product to the right 
Customer at the right 
time, Journal of 
Marketing Research 
“Firms are challenged to improve the effectiveness of 
cross-selling campaigns. The authors propose a 
customer-response model that recognizes the 
evolvement of customer demand for various products; 
the possible multifaceted roles of cross-selling 
solicitations for promotion, advertising, and education; 
and customer heterogeneous preference for 
communication channels. They formulate cross-selling 
campaigns as solutions to a stochastic dynamic 
programming problem in which the firm's goal is to 
maximize the long-term profit of its existing customers 
while taking into account the development of customer 
demand over time and the multistage role of cross-
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selling promotion. The model yields optimal cross-
selling strategies for how to introduce the right product 
to the right customer at the right time using the right 
communication channel.” 
Table 3: Economic analyses in the cross selling literature 
2.3 Complementary Studies of Cross Selling 
To complement the cross selling studies described in the previous 
sections, we are extending the literature review by taking studies of cross 
buying and price bundling into consideration. Both research fields could have 
noteworthy implications for cross-selling strategies. In contrast to cross selling 
and price bundling, the principal actor within cross buying research is the buyer 
instead of the seller. Cross buying “refers to the customer behavior of buying 
additional products and/or services from the same firm” (Shah et al 2012). The 
next section, 2.3.1, highlights a number of papers worth a mention. Thereafter, 
section 2.3.2 will focus on price bundling. Price bundling is an approach where 
the seller combines several products and/or services into a package, which is 
then sold at a single price. 
2.3.1 Cross Buying: The Purchase of Products from Multiple 
Categories 
In this section, four selected papers with respect to cross buying will 
be reviewed. The papers have been selected because of their theoretical and/or 
practical relevance and their proximity to the overall topic. Two of the papers, 
Verhoef et al. (2001) and Kumar et al. (2008), were published in an A-ranked 
journal. The other two papers are more practically oriented and Ngobo 2004 
was published in a journal ranked as C, and Mäenpää 2012 in a D-ranked 
journal. For this purpose, we refer to the VHB-JOURQUAL ranking (Hennig-
Thurau and Schrader 2008).One of the four papers, Verhoef et al. 2001, 
spotlights the need for customer satisfaction and loyalty as well as their impact 
and interference. The other three articles highlight the drivers and behavior of 
cross buying, its purpose and implications. 
The paper, “The impact of satisfaction and payment equity on cross-
buying: A dynamic model for a multi-service provider”, written by Verhoef et al. 
2001, analyzes the impact of satisfaction and 'fair-minded pricing' on 
customer's cross buying behavior. The outcomes show that, firstly, the impact 
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of satisfaction depends on the longevity of the relationship between customer 
and company. Secondly, long-time customers, in particular are influenced by 
pricing. The analysis is expanded by including the data of competitors. This 
data makes comparisons between different companies more transparent. The 
two major questions of the article are: firstly, does higher satisfaction result in 
increased cross buying? Secondly, how does price impact the cross buying 
behavior? In addition, the authors consider two overarching questions: how 
does this relate to competitor's offerings? And what influence does the duration 
of the relationship have? A dynamic statistical model is used for testing the 
claims and for providing significant answers to the two major questions and the 
two overarching ones. Table 4 summarizes the results. 
Claim Result 
The higher the level of satisfaction, the more likely that 
the customer cross buys. Rejected 
The higher the level of 'price fairness', the more likely that 
the customer cross buys. Rejected 
If the level of satisfaction with the company is higher, then 
with its competitor, than it is more likely that the customer 
cross buys. Rejected 
If the level of 'price fairness' with the company is higher, 
then with its competitor, than it is more likely that the 
customer cross buys. Confirmed 
The longer the relationship between company and 
customer, the higher the impact of satisfaction on cross 
buying. Confirmed 
The longer the relationship between company and 
customer, the higher the impact of price on cross buying. Rejected 
Table 4: Test results 'satisfaction and payment equity on cross-buying' (Verhoef et al. 2001) 
The second paper, which receives more attention, was written by P. V. Ngobo in 
2004 and bears the title “Drivers of customers' cross-buying intentions”. As the 
title implies, this article highlights the reason why customers cross buy. 
Companies may draw from them all the necessary conclusions, on how to earn 
additional revenue through cross selling. The article focuses on three major 
drivers, briefly described in the following: assuming the customer cross buys, 
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the customer might question if the company is able to serve all services/ 
products with the same due care and quality. Secondly, the paper assesses 
what role the comfort of cross buying, e.g. value of one-stop shipping, plays. 
Thirdly, the impact of customer satisfaction on cross buying is evaluated. The 
drivers were tested based on two data samples across two industries, retail and 
banking. The author deployed consumer surveys, which were evaluated by 
regression analysis, to discover why some customers cross buy. In conjunction 
with sub-criteria and/or minor constraints, all three major drivers can be 
verified, i.e.: 
 the customers trust the banking industry rather than the retail business 
to continuously provide a high level of quality, 
 the convenience and the comfort level of cross buying (e.g. through one-
stop shopping)is a reason why customers cross buy; 
 satisfaction is an important driver of cross buying, but not always 
supportive/ protective regarding certain sub-criteria and industry (e.g. 
satisfaction does not prevent that customers switch). 
Even if the survey results seem to be broadly positive, the customers still feel 
the threat of being dependent on only a few service providers. In a nutshell, 
what can companies, which would like to improve their cross selling success, 
learn from these results? Customers always expect high quality, regardless of 
which product will be bought. Companies need to make sure that they can 
deliver the quality they promised. Additionally, it would be beneficial for the 
companies to market the value of one-stop shopping and to concentrate on 
selling products which fit into their offerings, e.g. a car dealer also sells car 
insurance, but a bank should not add mobile phones to its product portfolio. 
One of the two core aspects of the following article also concentrates on the 
drivers of cross buying; however, now the study relates to the retail industry 
only. Focusing on the retail sector (more precisely: catalog retailing) implies 
that a non-contractual setting has to be assumed. Kumar et al.'s paper, “Cross-
buying in retailing: Drivers and consequences”, was published in 'The Journal of 
Retailing' in 2008. Kumar et al. quote Venkatesan and Kumar (2004) and 
thereby underline that cross buying improves the lifetime value of customers. 
The authors aim to add new drivers of cross buying to the ones which were 
already appointed in the earlier research works, such as satisfaction and 'fair-
minded pricing' (Verhoef et al. 2001), and continuous quality (Ngobo 2004). 
Also this work will help to identify why customers cross buy. Based on the 
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article outcomes, firstly, the companies shall use this understanding to initiate 
the right cross selling activities and secondly, to specifically approach the 
customers who are highly likely to cross buy. Kumar et al (2008) formulate 
several propositions regarding “drivers and consequences of cross buy”. 
Identified drivers are, for example, 'average inter-purchase time' or 'product 
returns'. Examples of consequences are, for example, 'revenue per order' or 
'number of orders in a given time period'. For testing these hypotheses, the 
data of customer purchases, across seven product categories, were taken into 
consideration (collected in the period from 1997 to 2004). The results shows 
those who are highly likely to cross buy are customers who procure at 
intermediate duration. These customers maintain a long-term relationship. In 
contrast, customers with a high ratio of returning products should be avoided 
as cross selling objectives. Nevertheless product returns should be seen as 
prospect to communicate with the customer and to improve the as-is situation. 
Considering that the tests prove marketing is a major driver of cross buying, 
Kumar et al (2008) note that the “identification of the drivers of cross-buy 
gives firms an important tool to maximize the effectiveness of cross promotion 
of product categories or brands.” 
As in several papers on cross buying, in the last of our four articles, “Drivers of 
cross-sectoral cross-buying behavior among business customers”, published in 
2012, Mäenpää also discovered the drivers of customers' cross-buying 
behavior, first in general, and then with particular attention to engagements 
within the B2B environment. With focus on financial services only, semi-
structured interviews with 22 customers (from one country) from the small to 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) were conducted. Mäenpää starts his paper by 
providing an extensive literature review. Based on this review, he comes to the 
conclusion, among other things, that most of the cross buying studies, focusing 
on financial services, identify behavioral loyalty as one of the key drivers of 
cross buying. But he also recognizes inconsistencies between different papers. 
For example, some studies claim that satisfaction has little to no impact on 
cross buying (Verhoef et al. 2001, research work introduced above), whereas 
other researchers prove a significant effect of customers' satisfaction on their 
cross buying attitude (Li et al. 2005).Also confirmed by the author's literature 
research is the importance of one-stop shopping as a cross buying driver. 
Several studies (Ngobo 2004, Vyas and Math 2006, Liu and Wu 2007, Jeng 
2008, Soureli et al. 2008) back up this finding, because one-stop shopping 
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covers the customer request for greater convenience. Again, on the basis of 
Mäenpää's thorough literature study, the author is able to compile the following 
table, which lists a significant number of cross buying drivers and their 
associated research findings. 
Selected 
drivers 
Selected findings 
Competitor's 
price 
The higher the level of 'price fairness' with the company, 
compared to competitor's level, the greater customer's intent 
to cross buy. 
Competitor's 
product 
portfolio 
The more diverse the product portfolio of the competitor, the 
less the readiness of the customer to cross buy. 
Corporate 
reputation 
The more reliable the company's reputation, the greater the 
likelihood of the customer's cross buying. 
Core 
competencies 
The more the supplementary products of the company move 
away from its core offerings, the more unlikely customer's 
intention to cross buy. 
One-stop 
shopping 
convenience 
The more convenient the company's sales structure, the 
stronger the customers’ cross-buying objectives. 
Personal 
relationships 
The better the relationship between seller and buyer, the 
greater customer's cross buying demand. 
Connectedness 
The more the company is connected to its customer, the higher 
the probability that the customer will cross buy further 
products.  
Table 5: Research findings regarding cross buying drivers (Mäenpää 2012) 
The author conducted interviews with key players of SMEs. At that time, all 
enterprises in scope were in a business engagement with a company of the 
finance sector, offering both banking and insurance services. The interview was 
partly conducted by closed questions, partly by open ones. As mentioned, the 
final scope included a sample of 22 SMEs, all based in Finland. The outcomes of 
the analysis show that the main drivers of cross buying additional banking 
services are the personal relationship between company and customer and the 
overall customer orientation. In the insurance sector, the decision of whether or 
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not the customer cross buys, depends on competitive prices and the coverage 
of the policy. 
By considering the customer's drivers of cross buying for the sales process and 
by initiating appropriate measures, the likelihood of the company's cross selling 
success increases greatly. 
2.3.2 Price Bundling: The Sell of Products Bundled and Offered at a 
Single Price 
To a certain extent, cross selling is anticipated by price bundling. The 
seller pre-empts decisions on buying additional products/ services from the 
same company by already consolidating several parts to one offering. Price 
bundling comes with price discounts. That implies that the total price of the 
bundle is less than buying both products isolated. As will be described in section 
7, granting price discounts often facilitates cross selling activities. Both the 
buyer and seller benefit from this practice. The buyer obviously pays a lower 
price. The seller trades more than one product at the same time and frequently 
products, which the customer would not buy separately. This increases the total 
amount of revenue and profit of the company, albeit by accepting lower 
margins. A suitable example of price bundling is provided by the American 
retailing company Target. Target sells the 'PlayStation 3' including games and 
additional controllers. Assuming that the customer might buy additional 
accessories anyhow, by selling this bundle, the retailer makes sure that the 
customer directly buys all products at Target and not later from a competitor. A 
much simpler example is the sale of Hot Dogs served with roll, ketchup, 
mustard, and other related items. 
Sheikhzadeh and Elahi (2013) concludes as follows: “Bundling has 
been extensively studied in the literature and its benefits have been manifested 
through three perspectives of achieving better price discrimination, helping to 
save costs, and preserving the power for deterring a potential entrant”. In the 
following, taken from a variety of scientific works we introduce three articles in 
more detail. The objective of the first paper, written by Stremersch and Tellis 
(2002), is to give a holistic overview of bundling, its associated terms, rules 
and strategies. According to the VHB-JOURQUAL ranking (Hennig-Thurau and 
Schrader 2008), this paper is classified as A+ (published in 'Journal of 
Marketing').The second article, by Arora (2008), issued in a D-ranked journal, 
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refers to some variables described in the first paper. Actually, this paper is 
much more practice oriented and evaluates the impact of price bundling based 
on the example of teeth whitening products. The last article, published in the 
'Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services' (C category) and written by Yan 
and Bandyopadhyay (2011), pictures how to best set up price bundling to 
maximize the company's profit. 
Stremersch and Tellis (2002) conclude their paper, “Strategic Bundling 
of Products and Prices: A New Synthesis for Marketing”, with offering a concept 
of suggestions on how and when to apply bundling strategy optimally. The 
authors criticize the misleading terms of bundling(i.e. inconsistent use) as well 
as the confusing legality of bundling (i.e. an unclear domain of application), 
which are documented in common literature. Thus, their goal is to provide an 
appropriate definition and a recognized legal framework. This elaboration offers 
“a new synthesis of the field of bundling”. The authors are able to provide this 
added value, because of on an extensive analysis of the marketing, economics, 
and law literature. Stremersch and Telliscome up with the following definition of 
price bundling: “Price bundling is the sale of two or more separate products as 
a package at a discount, without any integration of the products”. The author's 
proposed legal framework consists of two rules, the 'per se rule' and the 'rule of 
reason'. The rules are defined by several conditions, but in a nutshell, the rules 
have to make sure “that the bundling strategy of a firm should not hurt buyers 
by limiting competition” (Stremersch and Tellis2002). In a sum, the authors 
devised, “that price bundling of existing products may be optimal because it is a 
form of price discrimination between different consumer groups and because it 
decreases price sensitivity and increases individual consumers' purchase 
likelihood”. In addition, the consideration of the legal framework is relevant, 
because abuse of market power by applying price bundling may be a 
punishable offence. Erecting a structural market barrier is not acceptable. In 
some cases, company's management aspires to restrict the market entry for 
competitive start-up enterprises by applying price bundling methodology. Here, 
the authors refer to an antitrust case against Microsoft in the past years. The 
prosecution was directed against Microsoft's bundling Windows and Explorer to 
achieve a monopoly position. In the end Microsoft lost the anti-trust case and 
bundling these services was prohibited. Consequently, other companies had the 
opportunity to compete with innovative browsers. Thus setting up price 
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bundling strategies, viewed on a long-term basis without restricting market 
entries at short notice, is the appropriate managerial recommendation. 
“Price bundling and framing strategies for complementary products”, 
by Arora (2008), is another paper providing insights about possible ideal 
marketing strategies by combining framing and price bundling. The 
effectiveness of price bundling was proved. For this purpose, data of teeth 
whitening products was used. One core question from the author was: “should 
marketing managers consider incorporating price bundling as part of their 
pricing decision?” The results of the study show, that there is no one fits all 
answer. Actually not every customer agrees that bundles create added value 
and thus these market participants are not attracted by these kinds of 
offerings. Additionally, author's outcomes underline to apply “individual pricing 
approach for positively framed messages”, but for “the negatively framed 
messages, individual pricing is not advisable”. The definition of 'positively 
framed messages' comprises communications (i.e. very often via commercials 
and advertisements), which highlight the advantage of the product/ service or 
the positive impact on the customer's requirements and needs. In contrast to 
this, 'negatively framed messages' stress out the negative impact on customer 
fulfillment, if the product/ service would not be purchased. This definition 
emphasizes the value neglected by the customer by ignoring the company's 
offerings. 
The last paper regarding price bundling, which will be reviewed in 
more detail, is intended for companies finding the optimal bundling and 
associated pricing strategy to ultimately maximize their profits. Ruiliang Yan's 
and Subir Bandyopadhyay's article, “The profit benefits of bundle pricing of 
complementary products”, was published in 2011. The key results of the 
authors are: firstly, a bundle offering should consist of highly complementary 
products/ services, and price discounts should be considered. Secondly, the 
power of bundling offerings always augments with the size of the market and 
price sensitivity. One of the major challenges in cross selling is to determine the 
optimal incentives for the different parties, whereas the challenge in price 
bundling is not necessarily defining which products (or services) have to be 
offered together, but what is the right price for this bundle, taking into 
consideration the product-specific costs. Pricing is decisive for the success of 
bundling. For example, a low price for the first product supports the consumer 
acceptance to rate the second product with a much higher price. Cournot 
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(1938) records that in joint offerings; companies shall predicate the price of the 
bundle on the “value of the joint consumption”. The authors came to the above-
mentioned results by considering three research questions. “What is the 
optimal pricing strategy when there is no bundling? What is the optimum 
product and pricing strategy when the firm uses bundling? What is the value of 
a bundling strategy to the firm if the market is large and consumers are 
sensitive to price?” As an overall answer to these questions the authors 
introduce a profit-maximization model. Before sketching their model 
framework, the authors drew up an extensive literature research summarizing 
studies of complementary bundling. This literature research shows that 
companies involve their clients when it comes to establishing bundling 
strategies for services and less often to create strategies regarding the pooling 
of products. In their model two scenarios are compared, namely, one pricing 
strategy for no bundling and one for bundling. Aiming for profit-maximization, 
bundling strategies should always come with recognizable price discounts, 
especially, when the degree of complementarity between the two products is 
significant. Moreover, the greater the market size and price sensitivity of the 
consumers, the more powerful the bundling strategy. The major gap of the 
author's model seems to be the assumption of 'perfect information'. In the 
present model, the companies have full access to market information. Future 
researches should endeavor to come up with a more realistic picture by 
assuming 'incomplete' or at least 'imperfect information' and adding further 
companies to the modeling, so far only a single firm was considered. 
The major link between cross selling and price bundling is surely the 
impact of price discounts. Whereas price bundling strategies are coupled with 
price decreases, price discounts in cross selling are occasionally requested by 
the customer and/or sometimes offered by the company, always with the 
intention to boost sales and revenue through cross selling. However, the 
challenges of the companies applying these marketing strategies, price 
bundling and cross selling, are different. The challenge, when it comes to price 
bundling, is to find the optimal price of the bundle, while cross selling strategies 
are focused on setting the right incentives for the involved parties, especially 
for the sales forces. 
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A. CROSS SELLING IS INTRINSICALLY BENEFICIAL 
In Section A, it is continuously assumed that cross selling is 
intrinsically beneficial. This assumption will be important for the conceptual 
model development and the subsequent models. In the previous section, 
numerous studies where listed that underline the importance of cross selling 
practices and their benefits to companies. Amongst other things, cross selling 
allows the possibility of gaining a high return on investment (ROI) rate (Harding 
2002, Jarrar and Neely 2002, LaValle and Scheld 2006). The initial benefit of 
cross selling is founded on the business concept that transactional cost 
decreases if additional goods and services are sold to existing customers. This 
facilitates added value for both buyer and seller. 
3 Conceptual Model Development 
One business unit executive said, "I actively discouraged my sales 
team from playing ball (i.e. deploying cross selling – ed. note), because it didn't 
help our business unit" (Duclos et al. 2007). This section expands the idea of 
setting optimal (monetary) incentives to foster company-wide cross selling 
initiatives by exploring the behavior of organizational units across the 
distinctive levels of a divisionally structured organization. The research shows 
that three incentive problems accrue at three business levels. 
Consider a divisionally structured corporation with business units. 
Following the definition of Eisenhardt and Brown (1999) business units are 
components of an enterprise, which represent business processes and specific 
products or services under the leadership of a manager. The breakdown of a 
company into different business units is widely accepted in practice. Global 
corporations, such as Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Dell, Cisco Systems, and 
British Petroleum (Eisenhardt and Brown1999), IBM, Citigroup, ABB and Shell 
(Eisenstat et al.2001), just to name a few, are structured in different business 
units. The rationale for breaking down enterprises into business units are that 
individual business units can focus on their key accounts and on identifying new 
sales opportunities as well as having the flexibility to respond quickly to 
different market situations (Eisenhardt und Brown 1999). 
In this model, each business unit offers one particular product (e.g. 
sea-/air freight services offered by logistics companies or M&A service/financial 
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and commercial services offered by auditing firms) to their respective clientele 
(here key accounts). The model assumes that the products do not overlap and 
that each business unit has established an enduring business relationship with 
one primary key account. Furthermore, it is assumed that the business units 
are not willing to sell products from other business units. This behavior is 
rational if the management’s compensation policy for the business units is only 
linked to the selling efforts for their “own” products. Under these 
considerations, the business units have little or no impulse and inducement to 
participate in cross selling, because such actions sidetrack their attention and 
marketing efforts to boost their own sales output and thus do not create 
benefits for the single units (Kane 2005, Lo et al. 2011). 
Assume further that the business units are governed and controlled by 
management, which considers engagement in cross selling as a compelling 
growth opportunity (Duclos et al. 2007). One of the key challenges for the 
company is organizing the sales forces in the business units to fully utilize their 
existing customers' potential. This means the company needs to facilitate a 
setup where sales forces can easily cross sell further products. Such a setup 
ensures that business units benefit from selling across the borders of their 
assigned responsibilities with the intention of fully exploiting their clients' 
purchasing potential (Akçura and Srinivasan 2005, Gulati 2007, Kamakura et 
al. 2004, Kane 2005, Mundt et al. 2006). Research has disclosed that initiating 
and executing a successful cross-selling strategy is deemed to be very 
challenging. Successful cross selling depends on stable intra-organizational 
collaboration between the different business units (Akçura and Srinivasan 2005, 
Gulati 2007, Luo et al. 2006). Companies often neglect to bundle products and 
offer a holistic solution to their customers. The business units are therefore, 
unable to align their product portfolios, to eliminate overlaps or even to create 
synergies (e.g. by utilizing transactional cost savings). Instead, the sales 
managers of the different business units still have difficulties working together 
and are highly likely to be constantly competing with each other (Luo et al. 
2006). Thus, management needs to decide how to create a cross-divisional 
selling environment by launching incentives across the business units, so that 
obvious business prospects represent not a risk, but rather a chance to profit 
from a key selling possibility (Brown and Peterson 1994). Setting up company-
wide and cross-divisional incentives, however, is only the first step – the 
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3.1 Level 1: Management and Business Unit 
The first level of the analysis focuses on the relationship between 
Management and the Business Unit. Regardless of whether we relate Business 
Unit 1 selling product 2 in addition to its own product, or vice versa Business 
Unit 2 sells product 2 and product 1. This determination applies universally for 
level 1 and level 3 if it is referred to the Business Unit as such. The prospective 
benefits of cross selling (Kamakura et al. 2003, Liu and Cai 2007, Kamakura 
2008) prompt Management to emphasize this additional sales opportunity. By 
offering monetary incentives Management tries to motivate Business Unit 1 to 
cross sell. This attempt will only succeed if the incentives of additionally selling 
product 2 of Business Unit 2 are high enough to cover the increased costs. 
Costs now consist of the effort Business Unit 1 has to expend for selling its own 
product plus the effort to gather and customize the information about the 
unfamiliar product and to sell this product as well. 
Proposition 1. The Business Unit cross sells if the incentive (in the 
form of profit-sharing) regarding the unfamiliar product is greater than the 
costs of incorporating this. 
Principal-agent theory is used to model this scenario. Particular 
applications of the principal-agent problem have been made to the case of a 
company owner who cannot observe the effort level of a manager or worker 
(Grossman and Hart 1983). The principles of this theory are discussed in 
several earlier papers (Mirrlees 1975, 1976, Harris and Raviv 1979, Holmstrom 
1979, Shavell 1979). The theory assumes an asymmetric distribution of 
information between the involved parties, i.e. the agent has an information 
edge. Concrete examples where this theory is used are the following: Cravens 
et al. (1993), Evans et al. (1999) and Theilen (2003) analyze a solution of such 
moral hazard setup to elaborate an appropriated incentive structure that solves 
this agency problem. 
3.2 Level 2: Business Unit 1 and Business Unit 2 
The second level of the analysis explores the collaboration between 
Business Unit 1 and Business Unit 2. In general, the business units will not 
want to risk the mutual trust with its existing customer (Kumar 1999, Reinartz 
and Kumar 2000). For example, the business unit might find it hard to explain 
the unfamiliar product (product of the other business unit) in technical terms 
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and therefore does not sell it to their customer (Homburg and Jensen 2007) in 
order to avoid disappointing them, by selling a product that does not meet their 
needs. On the other hand, the business unit fears that the other unit would 
offend their customers with late deliveries and poor quality (Duclos et al. 
2007). From this follows that product knowledge is the foundation of selling. 
The business units require appropriate product details, firstly to gain confidence 
and secondly to assess if this product would provide additional value to their 
customer. 
Cross selling can be practiced successfully if information is exchanged 
between the business units (Kamakura 2008, Ansari and Mela 2003). The 
execution of this exchange means additional costs (in terms of effort in time) 
for both business units. An easily accessible product database would facilitate 
this exchange. In addition, internal marketing can strengthen knowledge of the 
products across the business units. If such database and internal marketing 
measures are not established, then the cost to gather and customize 
information about unfamiliar products is only dependent on the business units’ 
willingness to cooperate. Since there may be competition between the different 
units, it is possible the business units are not willing to share information about 
their various products (Martin and Eisenhardt 2010, Porter 2001). Business 
units could be afraid of losing potential customers and thus additional revenue. 
To establish transparent and efficient information exchange the Management 
has to set up an incentive structure, which ensures that cross selling provides 
results for both business units. 
Proposition 2. If the Management sets optimal incentives, Business 
Unit 1 and Business Unit 2 cooperate and exchange all the necessary 
information about their products, which is needed to execute cross selling 
efficiently. 
For level 2, the game Prisoner's Dilemma is considered, based on the 
analysis of the Folk Theorem in infinitely repeated games with discounting by 
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986, 1990). Assuming sufficiently little discounting, 
the Folk Theorem outlines that in infinitely repeated games every individually 
rational outcome can arise as a 'Nash equilibrium'. 
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3.3 Level 3: Business Unit and Key Account 
At the third level, two scenarios could occur: firstly, if the costs to sell 
an unfamiliar product, as described in level 1 and depending on level 2, are too 
high or vice versa, the incentives to cross sell are too low, then the business 
units might not follow the cross selling strategy of the management. 
The second scenario can occur, if the incentives are too high. The 
business unit may be able to sell the unfamiliar product without gathering and 
customizing information by exploiting the key account's trust in the business 
relationship. Thus, the unit gains a short-term benefit by saving these costs, 
but is open to risks if it sells the product to its customer without delivering 
additional value. After one sales period, the key account would recognize that 
there is no added value for its business. Consequently, it can be assumed that 
trust and the relationship is seriously damaged and the key account might 
refrain from buying any product or at least any unfamiliar product, from the 
business unit in subsequent periods. Finally, the company risks losing future 
revenue and the source of cross selling income. To avoid these scenarios the 
management has to define the right level of incentives. 
Proposition 3.1. The Business Unit does not cross sell if the costs of 
incorporating the unfamiliar product are too high or the incentives to cross sell, 
set by the Management, are too low. 
Proposition 3.2. If the Management sets too high incentives, then the 
Business Unit exploits the trust of its key account. The Business Unit sells the 
unfamiliar product without spending the time for incorporation and without 
creating additional value for its Key Account. The Business Unit benefits from 
the short-term profits. 
Proposition 3.3. In the event of 3.2, the Key Account refrains from 
buying any additional unfamiliar product from the Business Unit. 
Proposition 3.4. If the Management sets optimal incentives, then the 
Business Unit incorporates the unfamiliar product and cross sells only the 
product to the Key Account, which creates additional value. 
The infinitely repeated trust game, adopted from Kreps's (1990) 
analysis of corporate culture, is used to model level 3. Assuming the game is 
played only one time, the petitioner anticipates that trust will be mistreated 
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and, so, decides not to provide trust, while when the game is run over and over 
again, trust may be built up due to the fact that the counterpart may consider it 
as beneficial to establish a reputation for trustworthiness (Colombo and Merzoni 
2006). 
The proofs for the above listed propositions will be given in Section 4. 
3.4 Theoretical Principles of the Methods 
In this thesis, three methods are used to model three incentive 
problems that occur at three business levels. The first incentive problem is 
analyzed by the principal-agent theory. The principal-agent theory is an 
approach of the agency theory (Jensen 1983, Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theory 
deals with fixing problems that can occur in relationships between principals 
and agents. For the second incentive problem, the infinitely repeated Prisoner's 
Dilemma is applied and the third problem is modeled by the infinitely repeated 
trust game. The latter two methods belong to the research field of game 
theory. Myerson (1991) defines “game theory as the study of mathematical 
models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-
makers”. Game theory analyzes “situations in which two or more individuals” 
(players) make decisions that will affect one another's output. 
These three methods were briefly introduced in the previous sections. 
The following sections serve the purpose of classifying the methods in relation 
to the overall academic field. Additionally, the sections are intended to provide 
an overview of the theoretical framework and basic literature of the methods, 
but make no claim to completeness. 
3.4.1 Principal-Agent Theory 
'Neoclassical economics' are used as a starting point. In the center of 
neoclassical economics is the model called 'homo economicus'. Here the 
declared goal is to maximize utility. The actor is rational, has fixed preferences, 
complete information and responds to restrictions. Based on these assumptions 
and under the given alternatives, the homo economicus always selects the 
alternative that maximizes its utility. Hence, the neoclassical theory can be 
analyzed with the mathematical methods of maximization, optimization under 
constraints (Weintraub 1993). Neoclassical economics is criticized for its degree 
of abstraction and assumptions that are far from reality. The goal of the 'new 
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described as agency problem. The principles of the theory are compiled in 
several papers (Mirrlees 1975, 1976, Harris and Raviv 1979, Holmstrom 1979, 
Shavell 1979, Grossman and Hart 1983, Eisenhardt 1985, 1989). Agency 
problems appear in all organizations and in all cooperative effort; whenever one 
individual depends on the action of another. One typical agency problem is 
described by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). The authors underline the problem 
of shirking and monitoring team production. 
Within agency theory, there is a distinction between positive agency 
theory and principal-agent theory (Jensen 1983, Eisenhardt 1989). Both 
theories are sub-disciplines of contract theory within new institutional 
economics and both analyze the agency problem. 
Positive agency theory analyzes the problem to a greater extent 
empirically, whereas the principal-agent theory is abstract and mathematically 
oriented (Jensen 1983). Within positive agency theory, agency relationships are 
described and examined in terms of their characteristics, problems and the 
causes of these problems; the theory focuses on describing the governance 
mechanism (Eisenhardt 1989). Jensen and Meckling (1976) contribute greatly 
to this development by elaborating managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. These three elements are often summarized as 'theory of 
the firm'. 
Principal-agent theory is principally concerned with the normative 
aspects of agency relationships. The theory was developed in the field of 
information economics in the 1970s. The pioneers of the theory are Spence and 
Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross (1973). 
An essential element of the principal-agent theory is the assumption 
that the principal and the agent are in a relationship where the distribution of 
information is asymmetrical. Two types of asymmetric information can be 
distinguished: 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992). 
If the principal does not know certain properties of the agent before 
the contract was signed, so he cannot judge the quality of the agent ex ante, 
then the literature refers to models with 'hidden characteristics'. Models of this 
type are also subsumed under adverse selection. If the principal cannot observe 
the actions of the agent and in addition, if he cannot retrospectively assess the 
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agent's actions, then science talks about models with 'hidden action'. 'Hidden 
information' is present if the principal can indeed observe the actions, but 
cannot assess the quality of the actions, e.g. due to lack of expertise. The last 
two models describe situations that occur ex post, i.e. before the conclusion of 
the contract the principal and agent have the same information. Both model 
types are grouped together under moral hazard. Accordingly, “adverse selection 
and moral hazard always result in one party benefiting over the other mainly 
because they have more information or they bear lower levels of responsibility 
which make way for acting recklessly” (Hart and Holmstrom 1987, Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991, Sappington 1991). 
Therefore, in principal-agent theory, the principal looks for a way to 
solve the agency problem. The principal's challenge is to motivate the agent, so 
that finally both follow complementary objectives. Full control of the agent’s 
effort is not usually possible due to cost. But the principal can steer the agent's 
way of working towards his interest by setting up suitable incentive contracts 
for the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). 
While Jensen and Meckling (1976) focus their work on the 
“relationship between the manager (i.e. agent) of the firm and the outside 
equity and debt holders (i.e. principals)”; Mirrlees (1976), Harris and Raviv 
(1979) or Holmstrom (1979) analyze the optimal contract (including 
compensation incentives) between the employer (i.e. principal) and the 
employee (i.e. agent). The latter consider that uncertainty and imperfect 
monitoring are present. One reason for this imperfect situation is, for example, 
the fact of an unrealistic world of costless information flow. Reality shows that 
information is seldom offered to all concerned parties for free (Pratt und 
Zeckhauser 1985); consequently, only the 'second-best' solution can be 
achieved. The 'first-best' solution, i.e. pareto-optimal solution, is not possible 
due to the present asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between 
agent and principal (Pratt und Zeckhauser 1985). 
3.4.2 Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 
The infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma belongs to the studies of 
game theory. Game theory is primarily a subsection of mathematics, but the 
theory serves diverse application fields like political science, ethics, psychology, 
philosophy, law and economics, computer science and evolutionary biology. 
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encountering parties (Carmona 2006, Jiménez-Martínez 2006, Esmaeili et al. 
2009, Shin and Sudhir. 2010). Here in a simplified scheme, a game is 
composed of a set of players, a set of strategies for each player and the payoffs 
for each composition of applied strategies. The non-cooperative games are 
usually described in either normal (or strategic) form or extensive form. The 
normal form game is typically embodied by a matrix, which illustrates the 
players, strategies, and payoffs related to the chosen strategy combinations 
(see figure 7 on page 46). When the normal form is used to introduce a game, 
it is assumed that every player takes her actions simultaneously or, at any rate, 
without knowing the actions of the opponent. If players are aware of few 
decisions of the other players, then the game is typically displayed in extensive 
form (see figure 9 on page 51). The extensive form considers, in contrast to the 
normal form, the timing/sequencing of the players' decisions. This form is 
presented as a tree graph. In addition, a game can be symmetric and 
asymmetric, be played simultaneously and sequentially and games exist with 
perfect information and imperfect information (Leyton-Brown and Shoham 
2008). This will not be discussed in further detail, but is worth a mention. 
If a single stage game is played frequently, then it is called repeated 
game. Within a repeated game the players reply to each other's actions, and so 
each player must reflect on his decisions, because the player's actions have an 
impact on the future actions of the other players. The behavior of the players 
can be conditioned by the opportunity to punish or reward each other in 
subsequent rounds. The literature of repeated games describes the possibility 
of cooperation in enduring interactions. 
It is distinguished between finitely and infinitely repeated games. A 
finitely repeated game is defined as a game, which is played a set and known 
number of times, whereas the other is played continuously. On the one hand, 
there is still the probability that the game ends, but on the other hand the 
participants of the game never know when the last round will be played and 
they constantly believe that there will be a next period. Infinite repetition is the 
decisive criterion to achieve equilibrium in many stage games. Often 
equilibrium (e.g. cooperation in the game Prisoners' Dilemma) cannot be 
obtained if the game were played once or a known number of times. The core 
value of the approach is that repeated interaction might assist people to 
triumph over opportunistic behavior (Fudenberg and Levine 1983, Fudenberg 
and Tirole 1991). 
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In the field of economics, the theory of infinitely repeated games has 
been utilized in many areas. Based on this theory, Friedman (1971) and Green 
and Porter (1984) study industrial organizations; Klein and Leffler (1981) 
informal contracts; Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) issues of public finance. 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1990) apply a 
dynamic general equilibrium model to examine macroeconomic challenges as 
oligopolistic pricing and behavior. In addition, the theory of infinitely repeated 
games has been underlined by several experiments. Roth and Murnighan 
(1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983) are regarded as pioneers in this 
research field. For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1994) study an infinitely 
repeated public good game and prove that repetition leads to greater 
cooperation. Consequently, the experimental literature on infinitely repeated 
games has greatly expanded in recent years. 
The most common strategies in infinite games are the 'trigger 
strategies'. The game, played with trigger strategies, begins with mutual 
cooperation. The players choose cooperation, at least until one of the players 
defect. Consequently, as punishment, the other player defects as well. The level 
of punishment (e.g. defection forever or cooperation again after some rounds) 
depends on the trigger strategy that is used by the players. The most 
widespread trigger strategies are 'tit for tat' and 'grim trigger'. By using the 
strategy tit for tat, the punishment continues as long as the opponent plays 
defection. Assuming the grim trigger strategy, the punishment is ongoing: the 
players defect forever and bring an eternal end to cooperation (Tirole 1988). 
Grim trigger is the applied strategy in the models of Section 4.3 and 4.4. 
The method that is used in Section 4.3 is the game Prisoner's 
Dilemma. This game was developed by Albert W. Tucker in 1950 (Poundstone 
1992). This dilemma arises in a variety of sociological and economic situations. 
The game is applied by several science theorists to illustrate cooperation 
problems. Prisoner's Dilemma is a two player, non-zero-sum, non-cooperative, 
symmetric game. Both players know their own strategies and the possibilities of 
the other player, as well as all related payoffs. Both players must determine 
their strategy without knowing the choice of the other player. The players can 
choose between two behaviors: they have the opportunity to cooperate in order 
to achieve the high payoff or to defect and thereby find themselves in a worse 
state than if they had cooperated with each other in the decision-making 
process. To choose defection is the best strategy for the players if the game is 
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played a finite number of times. Players protect themselves and act 
opportunistically. If the game is played an infinite (or unknown) number of 
times and given that the players are 'sufficiently patient', choosing cooperation 
generates equilibrium where both players reach the high payoff (Fudenberg and 
Maskin 1986). 
3.4.3 Infinitely Repeated Trust Game 
As the name indicates, the infinitely repeated trust game follows the 
principles and strategies of the infinitely repeated games. Major impact on the 
theory of infinitely repeated trust games was provided by the works of Engle-
Warnick and Slonim (2004, 2006a, 2006b). 
Assuming the trust game is played only once, the demander does not trust the 
supplier, due to the fact that the demander expects that the supplier will abuse 
trust. Whereas, when the game is played continuously, trust can be established 
and mutual cooperation can be achieved. Finally, while playing the infinitely 
repeated trust game, mutual cooperation is the preferred strategy for both 
demander and supplier. Exploiting the customer's trust in the business 
relationship is not recommendable (Colombo and Merzoni 2006). The trust 
game is the applied method for the model in Section 4.4. 
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affects the payment to the Business Unit, P$%e&. The payment is modeled as P$%e& ' S , R$%e& + α, with a fixed and exogenously given base salary S (covers the 
fixed cost of the Business Unit) and a revenue share which depends on the total 
sales revenue 2R$%e&3 and the parameter α; α ∈ 0,1", which reflects the level of 
incentive the Management has set for selling the Business Unit's product 
without any cross-selling efforts. 
The goal of the benchmark model is to define the optimal incentive 
parameter . The Management's profit function is 
$%, &, defined over set 
incentive and the effort spent by the Business Unit. Supposing the function 
$%, & ' *%& ( *%& ( , the profit of the Management results by subtracting 
the payment to the Business Unit and the overhead cost (& from the total 
sales revenue. The overhead cost occurs exogenously and is constant. This cost 
refers to the ongoing expense of operating a business, e.g. administration and 
office expenses. Based on these assumptions, the profit function, 
$%, &, is 
increasing and linear in ; 67$68 > 0, but decreasing in ; 67$6: < 0. To simplify the 
subsequent modeling we refer to the following functions; 	%& ' =*%&" '% ( & + %&, %& ' 	=*%&" '  , %& +  and 
%, & ' =
$%, &" ' %& ( %& (. The utility function of (the managed sales force of) the Business Unit is $%& 
and defined over effort alone. The model is confined by assuming the Business 
Unit's utility function $%& ' *%& ( %&; 	$> > 0	, with the cost function %& '
?@ @, > > 0. Cost occurs for marketing and selling the product.  serves as a 
scaling parameter;  ∈ 0,∞". The effort cannot be contractually fixed by the 
Management. The idea is that  is a productive input and private information of 
the agent with direct disutility for the Business Unit. This creates an inherent 
difference in objectives between the principal and the agent. In total, the 
Management and the Business Unit are each assumed to act so as to maximize 
their expected profit and utility, respectively. 
Given a payment structure and knowing its costs, the Business Unit 
selects the effort to maximize its expected utility; %& ' =$%&". Thus the agent 
maximizes over e 
   %& ' %& ( %&.      (1) 
Given a selected incentive structure and the Business Unit's effort, the 
Management's expected profit is 
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%, & ' %& ( %& ( .     (2) 
Formally  is optimal if it solves the problem 
   max
%, & over       (3) 
 subject to %& ≥ F       (4) 
   %& is maximized over .     (5) 
The reservation utility F is determined by bargaining power or by 
market forces. In this case, we assume F ' , so it is equal to the level that 
the agent achieves by not selling any product. 
The problem of maximizing Π%, & over  and  subject only to (5) will 
be referred to as the first-best problem. To evaluate the optimal incentive 
structure set by the Management and to deduce the optimal effort level spent 
by the Business Unit that maximize the profit and the utility respectively, the 
Business Unit now maximizes over e in regard to the first-order condition, 
   %& ' %& ( %& '  , 2% ( & + %&3 ( ?@ @; 
   6H68 ' 6IJK:L8MNOP8OQ68 ' 0      (6) 
and chooses the optimal effort 
   ⟹ 	 (  ' 0	 ⟺	∗ ' :LP .     (7) 
By inserting (7) into (2) the Management now differentiate the 
function with respect to , 
   
%, & ' %& ( %& (  
   ' % ( & + %& ( 2 , 2% ( &%&33 ( ; 
   676: ' 6UVW
OX MJMVOWOX MYZ[6: ' 0     (8) 
and set in the Benchmark model the optimal incentive 
   ⟹	 LOP ( @:LOP ' 0 ⟺ ∗ ' ?@.     (9) 
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Taking ∗ into consideration, we obtain the optimal effort 
   ⟹	∗ ' L@P.       (10) 
Bearing in mind all assumptions and implied functions we now 
modeled the optimal incentive I∗ ' ?@Q the Management has to set to maximize 
its revenue and in addition, the Business Units optimal effort spent I∗ ' L@PQ is 
also disclosed. Based on this the Management obtains the expected profit 

%∗, ∗& ' % ( & + %∗& ( 2 , 2% ( &%∗&3∗3 (  ' LO@P (  ( ?@ LO@P (  ' LO\P (  ( and the Business Unit the expected utility %∗& '  , 2% ( & + %∗&3∗ (
?@ ∗@ '  , ?@ LO@P ( ?@  LO\PO '  , LO]P. 
4.2 Level 1: Optimal Incentive Structure to Foster Cross Selling 
According to our conceptual framework outlined above, the 
Management is now assumed to implement an initiative to foster cross selling 
by focusing on monetary incentives and therefore on profit-sharing payments. 
In this case, we assume that the Business Unit receives all necessary 
information from the other unit to be able to sell the unfamiliar product. In this 
first level of our analysis, the Business Unit utilizes the existing business 
relationship with its key account and sells its product along with the product of 
the other unit. Now product 1 and product 2 are in place. Both products are 
assumed to create value for the key account, i.e. the Business Unit has realized 
that the products meet the customer's needs. 
Thus, the profit function of the Management extends accordingly. Now 
we assume 
$ZJ%, 	, ?, @& ' *?K@%?, @& ( *%?, @& (  ( , where the company 
revenue consists of *?K@%?, @& ' %? ( ?& + ?%?& , %@ ( @& + @%@&, with still 
constant and exogenously given ^; ^ ∈ 0,∞ and ^ ' 0; _ ' 1,2 as well as the 
stochastic quantity sold of the products based on the effort, *?%?& ' ? , a? and *@%@& ' @ , a@ respectively, with =a?" ' =a@" ' 0. The assumption of non-
restricted effort; ?, @ ∈ 0;∞ is still in place. Additionally, the effort to sell 
product 1 is described by ?. The variable @ expresses the effort the Business 
Unit invests into product 2 for gathering and customizing the information about 
product 2 (the so far unfamiliar product) and for selling it. The payment to the 
Business Unit now expands over two products, *%?, @& '  , %?& +  , %@& +	, with the parameters  and 	; , 	 ∈ 0,1".  illustrating the level of incentive 
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the Management has set for selling product 1 (benchmark product). The 
revenue share of the second product is dependent on the level of incentive 
illustrated by 	 and again chosen by the Management. In this section the goal 
is to define the optimal incentive parameter  and 	. Furthermore, the 
overhead cost %& occurs and remains unchanged and the Management has to 
cover additional implementation cost %&, e.g. to put necessary prerequisites 
for cross selling in place. Prerequisites can be establishing or improving a CRM 
system and executing sales training. In the model, this cost is supposed to be 
exogenous and fixed. As in the benchmark model, we define 
ZJ%, 	, ?, @& '=
$ZJ%, 	, ?, @&", ?K@%?, @& ' =*?K@%?, @&" and %?, @& ' 	=*%?, @&". The 
Business Unit's utility function is enlarged by incorporating @, the effort to sell 
the additional product 2 to its key account. Effort  to sell the basic product 
(here product 1) is converted into ?. We obtain the following utility function: $ZJ%?, @& ' *%?, @& ( %?, @&, with the updated cost function; %?, @& ' ?@ ?@ ,
@@, with higher cost for the unfamiliar product. One part of the costs I?@ @@Q 
that occurs regarding product 2 is related to gathering and customizing 
information about the unfamiliar product, the other to selling it, also ?@ @@. The 
cost function is substantiated by the drop in the transactional costs. As 
mentioned in Section 1, cross selling is, inter alia, profitable because the 
Business Unit sells an additional product to its already existing key account. 
Hence no further acquisition and contractual costs arise, but a higher lifetime 
value (revenue per client) is achievable. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (listed on page 28). Now given the new 
payment and cost structure, the Business Unit decides on the effort to 
maximize its utility, given that ZJ%?, @& ' =$ZJ%?, @&". Thus the agent 
maximizes over ? and @ 
   ZJ%?, @& ' %?, @& ( %?, @&.    (11) 
Given the expanded incentive structure and the Business Unit's efforts 
for product 1 and 2, the Management's profit is 
   
ZJ%, 	, ?, @& ' ?K@%?, @& ( %?, @& (  ( . (12) 
Formally  and 	 are optimal if they solve the problem 
   max
ZJ%, 	, ?, @& over  and 	    (13) 
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 subject to ZJ%?, @& ≥ F      (14) 
   ZJ%?, @& is maximized over ?, @.   (15) 
The reservation utility is still F, the same utility as the Business Unit 
receives in the benchmark, in other words when the agent does not sell any 
products or the amount the agent would receive on the market by working for 
another company. 
To determine the right incentives, set by the Management, to foster 
cross selling and to define the optimal effort the Business Unit will spend, the 
agent maximizes over ? and @ and in regard to the derived effort the principal 
differentiates with respect to  and 	: 
   ZJ%?, @& ' %?, @& ( %?, @& 
   '  , 2%? ( ?&?%?&3 , 2%@ ( @&@%@&3	 
   (I?@ ?@ , @@Q; 
   6Hbc68N ' 6IJK:LN8NKdLO8OMNOP8NOMP8OOQ68N ' 0;    (16) 
   6Hbc68O ' 6IJK:L8NKdL8OMNOP8NOMP8OOQ68O ' 0.    (17) 
The optimal effort to spend for the familiar product is 
   ⟹ ? ( ? ' 0 ⟺ ?∗ ' :LNP ,     (18) 
the effort for the unfamiliar product should be 
   ⟹ 	@ ( 2@ ' 0 ⟺ @∗ ' dLO@P .    (19) 
By inserting (18) and (19) into (12) and in regard to the first-order 
condition 
   
ZJ%, 	, ?, @& ' ?K@%?, @& ( %?, @& (  ( ; 
   ' %? ( ?&?%?& , %@ ( @&@%@& 
   (2 , 2%? ( ?&?%?&3 , 2%@ ( @&@%@&3	3 (  ( ; 
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   67bc6: ' 6UVWN
OX KeWOOOX MJMVOWNOX MeOWOOOX MYZMfZ[6: ' 0;   (20) 
   67bc6d ' 6UVWN
OX KeWOOOX MJMVOWNOX MeOWOOOX MYZMfZ[6d ' 0;   (21) 
For product one, the Management keeps the same incentive as in the 
benchmark, 
   ⟹ LNOP ( @:LNOP ' 0 ⟺ ∗ ' ?@,     (22) 
and for the second product the Management sets, 
   ⟹ LOO@P ( @dLOO@P ' 0 ⟺ 	∗ ' ?@.     (23) 
Taking ∗ and 	∗ into consideration and subject to all implied functions 
and assumptions, we obtain the optimal efforts the Business Unit spends to put 
cross selling into practice efficiently; 
   ⟹ ?∗ ' LN@P and      (24) 
   ⟹ @∗ ' LO\P.       (25) 
Based on the assumptions we made, the Management receives a total 
profit of 
ZJ%∗, 	∗, ?∗, @∗& ' %? ( ?&?%?∗& , %@ ( @&@%@∗& ( 2 , 2%? ( ?&?%?∗&3∗ ,2−222∗	∗−−'122,224−−12122−12224−−'124,228−( (  and the Business Unit generates the utility sum of ZJ%?∗, @∗& '  ,
2%? ( ?&?%?∗&3∗ , 2%@ ( @&@%@∗&3	∗ ( I?@ ?∗@ , @∗@Q '  , ?@ LNO@P , ?@ LOO\P ( ?@  LNO\PO (
 LOO?iPO '  , LNO]P , LOO?iP. 
Considering this setup, the profit the Management made by cross 
selling is higher than without applying cross selling: 
ZJ ≥ 
 ⟺ LNO\P , LOO]P (  (  (
 ≥ LO\P (  (  ⟺ LOO]P ≥ 0; ' ? (same product), if the condition that the extra 
earnings through cross selling are high enough to offset the set up costs has 
been fulfilled; LOO]P ≥ . Additionally, the utility of the Business Unit within the 
cross selling structure is higher than without; ZJ ≥ ; with  ' ?(same 
product),  , LNO]P , LOO?iP ≥  , LNO]P ⟺ LOO?iP ≥ 0. Thus, the Business Unit cross sells. 
Optimal Incentives to Foster Cross Selling: An Economic
 
4.3 
regarding information relating to the products involved (Kamakura 2008, Ansari 
and Mel
focuses on the requirement that business units cooperate with each other. 
When people 
promises 
this, 
participants to reply to the actions of
must take i
Figure 7 provides intuition
game, where Business Unit 1 is the row player and Busines
column player (C for cooperate and D for defect).
product information which enable
achieve utility 
the effort to pass on information. Supposing both units defect by not 
exchanging information and consequently continue with the
engaging in cross selling, they achieve 
if one Business Unit defects (D) and keeps the information private although the 
other unit cooperates (C) and passes on information, the first unit obtai
the latter just
Unit 
contrast, the other unit increases its utility by cross selling based on the 
Level 2: Collaboration between the Business Units as a 
Prerequisite
Efficient cross selling i
a 2003). Thus, the analysis of l
co
regarding
we apply an infinitely repeated 
nto account the 
If both players choose C, they cooperate by exchanging the essential 

 %(&, but cannot cross
 
me together and work together
 future behavior 
Figure 
ZJ ( ; where 
( . The latter unit transfers information to the other Business 
mplies an exchange between the 
might
reactions of her
 by considering a
7: Normal
s the Business Units to cross sell, then they  is a fixed but minor cost element that reflects 
-sell due to the lack of product information. In 
evel 2 of our conceptual framework 
 manipulate
Prisoner’s D
 the counterpart, and so each participant 
 counterpart in making his decision. 
 P
-form game for l
 as in the benchmark situation. Finally, 
 Analysis
 again and again
 actual
ilemma. Repeated play enables
risoner’s D
 
evel 2 
 
business u
, threats and 
 behavior. Based on 
ilemma as the stage
s Unit 2 is the 
 
ir business without 
46
nits 
ns ZJ, 
 
 
 
Optimal Incentives to Foster Cross Selling: An Economic
 
received e
setup and the utility functions 
matrix (figure 8).
the strict dominance of defection, the only Nash equilibrium (NE) of the stage 
game is (D,D). Defection in every round is also the only sub
equilibrium (SPE) when the stage game is repeated 
Only repetition for an infinite number of periods can 
cooperation. Assuming the grim trigger strategy
in the first period, and 
opponent, following which, the player 
to cooperation. Axelrod (2000) stated that grim trigger is the most strictly 
unforgiving of strategies in an iterated game, because a single defect by the 
opponent trigger
begin 
the other player chooses D, then 
period. Defection can be 
must balance the 
payment from defection 
grim trigger strategies is a NE when players focus on
call (C,C) mutual cooperation. The dependency on each other drives the 
motivation of the Business Units to cooperate by sharing the required product 
information. However
Prisoner’s 
Management facilitating cross selling, mutual cooperation will be the preferred 
strategy of the Business Units.
ssential information about the unfamiliar product. Considering this 
In the one
with and then
Dilemma. Nevertheless, due to the message sent out by the 
 
Figure 
-time P
carr
s defection forever. That means the
 for as long as the other player chooses C. If in any period 
served
actual value of 
plus
, always defecting remains a NE in the infinitely repeated 
generated above
8: Payoff matrix for l
risoner’s D
ies on to cooperate until a single defection by
 with penalty, in which case a 
ongoing
 the long
 
ilemma game it is well known that, due to 
defects forever and brings an eternal end 
player 1 chooses D in every subsequent 
 cooperation against the short
-term loss from penalty. Thus the pair of 
 Analysis
, we obtain the following payoff 
evel 2 
a finite number of times. 
, a player 
 first player chooses C to 
 long
 
 
-game perfect 
facilitate
starts by cooperating 
possible
-term objectives. We 
47
 maintain
 the 
 defector 
-term 
 
 
Optimal Incentives to Foster Cross Selling: An Economic Analysis 48 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 (listed on page 29). We consider the game Γ in 
its strategic form (figure 8). In the following, we call it the stage game. Then kl 
is a game represented in extensive form where the stage game Γ is repeated 
for m periods, and the infinitely repeated stage game is given by kn. Periods are 
indexed by o. All previous outcomes are known before the next period of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is played. The game consists of two players _ ' 1, 2; 
Business Unit 1 and Business Unit 2. Denote the set of actions and payoff 
function of each player by p^ and q^ respectively. p ' p? + p@ is the set of action 
pairs with the typical element rs which will be chosen in period o. Due to the 
symmetry of the game, p? ' p@ ' t, uv. The payoff function is defined as q^: p → ℝ. After each round with probability z there will be a new round; while 
with probability 1 ( z the interaction terminates and the two players will never 
meet again (i.e. will not have the opportunity to exchange needed information 
for cross selling); z ∈ %0, 1&. Then the expected per-round payoff { is given by 
   { ' %1 ( z&∑ zsM?ls}? q^%rs&  _ ' 1, 2.  (26) 
Once the two players will never meet again, they will only obtain  , LNO]P 
for each round. Suppose Business Unit 1 uses the grim trigger strategy; if 
Business Unit 2 exercises the same strategy, then the outcome is (C,C) in every 
period with expected per-round payoff 
   {Z ' %1 ( z&∑ zsM?ns}? I , LNO]P , LOO?iP ( Q 
   ' %1 ( z& JKWNO~XK WOONXM?M '  , LNO]P , LOO?iP (     (27) 
for each player. If however, for instance, Business Unit 2 deviates from this 
strategy and does not support mutual cross selling in order to capture the 
short-term payment from defection (by saving the additional cost element  
that occurs if cross selling is executed on a cooperative level), then in at least 
one period their action is D. As a response, Business Unit 1 chooses D in all 
subsequent periods, and therefore, Business Unit 2 subsequently selects D as 
well (best response strategy). This round, from the first period in which 
Business Unit 2 chooses D on, the total discounted payoff is, with  ' ? (same 
product), 
    ' %1 ( z& I , LNO]P , LOO?iPQ , %1 ( z&∑ zsns}? I , LNO]PQ 
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   ' %1 ( z&I , LNO]P , LOO?iPQ , UJKWN
O~X[%?M&  
   ' I , LNO]P , LOO?iPQ %1 ( z& , z I , LNO]PQ 
   '  , LNO]P , LOO?iP ( z LOO?iP.      (28) 
The value of cooperation is higher than the short-term payment from 
defection %{Z ≥ {&, if the cost to pass on information to the other Business Unit 
is smaller than the loss the Business Unit accepts by leaving cooperation; 
 , LNO]P , LOO?iP (  ≥  , LNO]P , LOO?iP ( z LOO?iP ⟺  ≤ z LOO?iP. 
Finally and based on all previously made assumptions, we can 
conclude that the Business Units cannot increase their payoff by deviating and 
not supporting cross selling if the players care about the future and pursue 
long-term goals. Cooperation is then the advisable behavior. Business Unit 1 
and Business Unit 2 cooperate and exchange all necessary information about 
their products, which are needed to execute cross selling efficiently. 
4.4 Level 3: The Management Ensures Long-Term Customer 
Retention 
In the cross selling scenario, supporting our considerations, the 
customer buys an additional product or service and gains from decreasing 
transaction cost, but also trusts the seller's reliability to deliver a quality 
product with the promised added value (Sonnenberg 1988, Geyskens et al. 
1999, Ngobo 2004). If the seller does not perform as promised the business 
unit risks the loss of its reputation (Weigelt and Camerer 1988, Johnson et al. 
2014). A key account that has been cheated in the first period can punish the 
business unit in the next period by refraining from buying any product or at 
least any additional unfamiliar product from the seller. Here we assume the 
latter case. 
In level 3 of our analysis, we anticipate the two scenarios as described 
in the conceptual framework: in the first scenario, the Business Unit increases 
its profit by also selling the second product to its Key Account. In return the 
purchase of the product creates added value to the customer (outcome of level 
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1). In the second scenario, the Business Unit strives for the short-term 
payment option. The unit sells product 2 to the Key Account without spending 
effort on gathering and customizing information about this product and 
therefore, without knowing if the product meets the need of its Key Account. 
The Business Unit exploits the mutual trust and risks disappointing its 
customer. Due to the fact that the unit neglects spending time getting familiar 
with product 2 but still invests the effort in selling it, we consider the following 
adjusted cost function; %?, @& ' ?@ ?@ , ?@ @@. Given that the payment function 
and incentives remain unchanged as well as under the consideration of the new 
cost function, the Business Unit updates its optimal effort regarding product 2. 
By using the same derivation method as in the benchmark model: 6Hbc68O ' 0, the 
unit now spends ́@ ' LO@P. As a result of going for the short-term payment option, 
the Business Unit achieves the following utility; ZJ%?∗, ́@& '  , LNO]P , LOO]P. Trusting 
the Business Unit's reliability, the Key Account buys the cross sold product. 
After recognizing that the product does not render any added value, we 
assume, that the Key Account no longer buys any unfamiliar products from the 
Business Unit. 
At this level, we use the infinitely repeated trust game; player 1 (‘Key 
Account’) and player 2 (‘Business Unit’) can engage in mutually profitable 
cooperation. Figure 9 illustrates the trust game, represented in extensive form. 
First, player 1 chooses between N (No Trust) and T (Trust). In the case of N, 
the game is over and player 1 receives ? ( ?(with ^ ∈ ℕ, _ ' 1,2 and ^ > ^) 
and player 2 gets  , LO]P. In the case of T, now player 2 decides between E 
(Exploiting) and R (Rewarding). Whereas R yields %? ( ?& , %@ ( @& for player 
1 and  , LNO]P , LOO?iP for player 2. Player 2 receives  , LNO]P , LOO]P and player 1 just ? ( ? ( @ in case of E (Anderhub et al. 2002). 
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Player 1, here the Key Account, plays T in the first period. Thereafter, if all 
moves in all previous periods have been T and R, play T; otherwise, play N. If 
given the move this period, Player 2, here the Business Unit, plays R if all 
moves in all previous periods have been T and R; otherwise, play E. As in the 
previous game theory model, we will show that the grim trigger (T,R) in a 
repeated game is a NE when players' strategies are based on long-term 
objectives. 
Proof of Propositions 3 (listed on page 30). We suppose Γ to be the 
trust game in figure 9. The game consists of two players _ ' 1, 2. Player 1 is the 
Key Account and player 2 the Business Unit. Let k? ' tm,v and k@ ' t=, v be the 
pure strategy sets of the Key Account and the Business Unit with generic 
element ? and @. Assuming the game is repeated for m periods %m ' ∞&, 
indexed by o, we obtain kl. All previous outcomes are known before the next 
period’s trust game is played. Let ℎs ' %?s , @s& be the pair of actions chosen by 
the two players at round o. We consider ^%ℎs& as the payoff received at round o 
by player _. As indicated above, z ∈ %0, 1& represents the probability that there 
will be a new round. The expected per-round payoff  is given by 
    ' %1 ( z&∑ zsM?ls}? ^%ℎs&     (29) 
Once the two players will never meet again, player 1 will only obtain 
? ( ? and player 2 only  , LNO]P for each round. Assuming both players follow the 
grim trigger strategy, i.e. player 1 chooses T and player 2 responds with R, the 
expected per-round payoff for the Business Unit is 
    ' %1 ( z&∑ zsM?ns}? I , LNO]P , LOO?iPQ ' %1 ( z& JKWN
O
~XK WOONX?M  
   '  , LNO]P , LOO?iP.       (30) 
The payoff for the Key Account would be l, ' %1 ( z&∑ zsM?ns}? 2%? (1,2(2'1(z1(1,2(21(z'1(1,2(2. 
On the other hand, if the Business Unit deviates from this strategy to 
benefit from short-term payment by playing exploitation, then the expected 
per-round payoff of the Business Unit is 
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    ' %1 ( z& I , LNO]P , LOO]PQ , %1 ( z&∑ zsns}? I , LNO]PQ 
   ' %1 ( z&I , LNO]P , LOO]PQ , UJKWN
O~X[%?M&  
   ' I , LNO]P , LOO]PQ %1 ( z& , z I , LNO]PQ 
   '  , LNO]P , LOO]P ( z LOO]P.      (31) 
And for the output of the Key Account we find l, ' %1 ( z&%? ( ? (2,1(zo'1∞zo1(1'1(z1(1(2,z1(11(z'1(1(21(z,z1(1'1(1(1(z2. 
Taking into consideration all previously constructed assumptions we 
can state the following: to cross sell if the product brings additional value to the 
Key Account is more profitable than to exploit the existing trust I ≥  ⟺  ,
LNO]P , LOO?iP ≥  , LNO]P , LOO]P ( z LOO]P ⟺ z LOO]P ≥ LOO?iP ⟺ z ≥ ?@Q, if the probability z that the 
interaction does not terminate, and thus ensures the players meet again, is 
sufficiently high, here this means higher or equal to 0.5. The higher z, i.e. the 
more important the future, the lower the payoff of the Business Unit that 
selects exploitation. 
Taking all these assumptions into consideration, we can finally 
summarize that the Business Units cannot boost their profit by exploiting and 
not executing cross selling in the correct way if the players care about the 
future and track long-term objectives. Additionally, the Key Account also 
benefits from cross selling 2l, ≥ l, ⟺ %? ( ?& , %@ ( @& ≥ ? ( ? (%1 ( z&@ ⟺ @ ≥ z@&, here the added value through product 2 is greater than 
the occurring product price. Following this, the Business Unit incorporates the 
unfamiliar product and only cross sells products to the Key Account which 
create additional value. 
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5 Discussion of Results and Conclusions 
In this research, we explored the underlying mechanisms that are 
supposed to affect the attempts of corporate management to implement cross 
selling initiatives in multiproduct companies, which are organized in product-
oriented business divisions and, at the level of each business unit, serve a 
limited number of mutually exclusive key accounts. Against this background, 
we developed an analytical modeling framework, which accommodates the 
relationships across three different organizational levels. Our economic analyses 
have detected a set of incentive problems, which need to be successfully 
resolved to efficiently manage cross selling initiatives. 
5.1 Analytical Results of the Model 
The first key challenge of implementing cross selling is solved by 
setting the optimal incentive structure for the organization’s business units. 
Taking into account all assumptions made in this study and the functions 
implied by the conceptual modeling framework we can conclude the following: 
The optimal incentives for a business unit, i.e. the percentage income 
of the revenue sharing, have to be equal to sell the product of the other 
business unit I∗ ' 	∗ ' ?@Q. Our model implies that by establishing optimized 
incentives, cross selling is profitable for both business units %ZJ ≥ & and 
management %
ZJ ≥ 
&; subject to the assumption that the extra earnings 
gained by cross selling are higher than the cost to implement cross selling 
ILOO]P ≥ Q, the management benefits. Moreover, our analysis underlines the 
value of cooperation between the business units. To collaborate and so to strive 
for long-term payment is profitable for the business units %{Z ≥ {&, if the cost 
to pass on product information to the other business unit is smaller than the 
loss a business unit has to accept when not cooperating I ≤ z LOO?iPQ. Here 
cooperation is the advisable behavior. 
Likewise, by implying that a business unit disregard the short-term 
payment, our analysis shows that exploiting the customer's trust in the 
business relationship is not a recommended strategy. In cross selling, the 
preferred strategy should be for the product to bring additional value to the key 
account % ≥ &. Additionally, cross selling is also profitable for the key 
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account 2l, ≥ l,3, if the added value delivered by the cross sold product is 
greater than the occurring product price %@ ≥ z@&. Finally, we can conclude 
that business units cannot increase their utility by deviating from cooperation 
between the units or exploiting their customers if the business units care about 
the future and follow long-term goals. 
5.2 Managerial Implications: How to Push Cross Selling 
Successfully? 
When the management wishes to motivate its business units to cross 
sell products or services, they must not only ask why it is profitable for the 
customer, but also for the business units. But how is it possible to make cross 
selling a key component of the company’s marketing instruments? How can 
collaboration between the business units be strengthened? How can customer 
loyalty be stabilized? In other words, how can cross selling success be 
facilitated? Based on the model and the derived optimal incentives, we illustrate 
the effects on business units and corporate management using two extreme 
scenarios and show, which cogs need to be moved to answer the above 
questions. 
In the first scenario, called 'Cost Cutting Strategy', the management 
focuses on quick wins and short-term savings by reducing costs, like 
administrative budgets and office expenses % ↓&, to an absolute minimum, or 
by eliminating investments in IT systems, sales trainings or marketing 
resources % ↓&. These cost cuts affect the management’s profit positively, 
but only in the short term; 
ZJ ↑. However, disinvestments in marketing and 
information systems can erode the long-term prerequisites of efficient cross 
selling. According to our model framework, the business units cost %& for 
passing on information would increase and thus utility decreases; ZJ ↓. Once 
 > z LOO?iP is given the business unit does not have any incentive to engage in 
cross selling. Consequently, the profit of the management and the utility of the 
business unit would reduce to the level of the Benchmark 
 and , respectively. 
In addition, assuming the business unit is unable to sell any product, i.e. ?, @ ' 0, the payment to the unit decreases to the level of the fixed base salary %%?, @& ' &, but as a consequence of the cost cutting strategy management 
also reduces the base salary of the unit % ↓&. Below a certain threshold, e.g. M < F, the business unit's utility ZJ ' M is too low to keep the managed sales 
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could also emerge organically from the model structure. The assertion risking 
the mutual trust could also be expressed by the model construction and results 
derivation. This issue will be tackled by the extended modeling in Section B 
('Cross Selling may Turn out to be Non-Beneficial'). In addition, we limited the 
decision-making units involved in our modeling framework to focus on the 
optimization of the incentive structure. In particular, level 1 and 2 of the model 
could be extended by adding several business units and thus several offered 
products, if appropriate. Furthermore, sub-levels could be incorporated. For 
now, the business unit is treated as one (managed sales force driven) entity 
with a homogeneous utility function; consequently, we neglected the possibility 
of intra-unit conflicts of interest arising among the various decision-making 
units within the business unit (e.g. sales manager and salesperson). Likewise, 
the model could be extended to multiple key accounts, which again could 
internally be split into different business units, but for the sake of simplicity in 
this paper we assumed a centralized procurement at the customer's side. 
Additionally, a more refined modeling approach could relax our 
assumption of freely scalable (marketing) efforts at the business unit level, for 
example by opposing budgetary constraints. Our analyses also do not account 
for differences in risk propensity. For example, a risk seeking business unit can 
be assumed to cross sell more even with less information about the unfamiliar 
product than a risk-averse unit. In our framework, risk is operationalized as the 
likelihood to disappoint the key account. Other limitations arise with the 
specification of the cost function of the business unit. One might argue that 
after a few periods of cross selling Business Unit 1 becomes familiar with 
product 2 and no information acquisition effort is required anymore. 
In sum, however, this is a first approach to closing the research gap 
with regard to the systematic analysis of incentive problems and the optimal 
incentive structure in cross selling environments. 
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B. CROSS SELLING MAY TURN OUT TO BE NON-
BENEFICIAL 
In Section B, we also consider various reasons why cross selling may 
turn out to be non-beneficial. The benefits and importance of cross selling are 
recognized by economists and business management. Generally, the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. However, to create a more realistic 
scenario and to make concluding recommendations more tangible, it is 
worthwhile emphasizing the negative sides of cross selling by compiling a 
literature review which highlights critical studies of cross selling (Section 6). 
Based on that, we adjust the existing model of Section 4 by considering the 
risks and hazards of cross selling (Section 7 and 8). 
6 Literature Review of Critical Studies of 
Cross-Selling 
We provide a summary of published research emphasizing risks and hazards of 
cross selling in Table 5. In spite of a significant amount of papers describing 
cross selling as consistently positive, we also observe several studies, which 
defined reasons why cross selling might be non-beneficial. Although not all 
these studies directly refer to cross selling's downsides as such, there is a link 
to factors, which also influence an efficient realization of cross selling. The 
table, highlighting these studies, is structured in six columns. One of the 
columns is named 'impacting factor category'. In total, five categories are 
defined. The five associated 'impacting factors' are often the reasons why cross 
selling may be a burden for the overall success of companies. The impacting 
factors concerned are: 'higher vulnerability to failure', 'competitive vs. cross 
selling', 'service demanders', 'spending limiters' and 'cherry picking' – more on 
this in the following sections. Further columns of the table cover inter alia: 
research purpose, research method, key findings and limitations as well as 
future research. 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
Dowling and 
Uncles 1997, 
Sloan 
Management 
Review 
- Investigation if customer 
loyalty programs pay off for 
companies, i.e. increase 
customer loyalty. 
- To analyze the linkage of 
customer rewards to loyalty 
programs. 
- To illustrate how an 
effective loyalty program has 
to be designed. 
- Creation of a 
more critical analysis of 
loyalty programs. 
- Literature review 
- Consulting 
toolbox 
- Service 
demanders 
- Spending 
limiters 
- Loyalty programs intend to retain 
customers to a company or its products/ 
services and to gain additional sale. 
- Loyalty programs do not gain market 
share, more likely protect as-is situation. 
- Several different reasons for disloyal 
behavior, e.g. different needs, for variety, 
out of stock, special deals. 
- Immediate reward (e.g. price cut) bonds 
customers more likely than the promise of a 
possible but delayed reward. 
- Design of loyalty program shall increase 
the value proposition of a product/ service; 
program needs to consider profitability of 
different types of customers. 
- Proposed design of 
loyalty program not 
validated. 
- Limited number of 
practical examples 
(focus on frequent 
flyer program). 
- Empirically test the 
practical advice. 
Reinartz and 
Kumar 2000, 
Journal of 
Marketing 
- Prove the profitability of 
long-lasting customers in 
non-contractual scenarios 
based on rigorous and 
differentiated empirical 
analysis. 
- Driver of composing this 
article is the nonexistence of 
empirical evidence in this 
non-contractual 
environment. 
- Present to what level 
- Data of large 
U.S. catalog 
retailer, over 
three years on 
daily basis 
- Discriminant 
analysis 
- Empirical 
analysis 
- Service 
demanders 
- Cherry 
picking 
- In contractual relationship serving 
customers over a longer period is favorable. 
- In non-contractual setup, long-lasting 
customers are not always profitable: long-
lasting customers with low revenue 
contribution have a slightly positive trend in 
the profitability evolution, but not valid for 
long-lasting customers with high revenue 
contribution. 
- Costs of supplying long-lasting customers 
are not lower. 
- Assumption that long-lasting customers 
- Single-sided data 
out of one industry 
(retailer) 
- Further product 
categories (in other 
non-contractual 
contexts) shall be 
added. 
- Extend the scope 
of data by including 
consumer's 
opinions/ attitudes. 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
aspects, like lower costs of 
serving and willingness to 
pay higher prices, assures 
profitability of long-lasting 
customers 
are less price-sensitive is disproved. - Explore the 
relationship of 
acquisition cost and 
lifetime profitability. 
Verhoef et al. 
2001, Journal of 
Retailing 
- Analyze the impact of the 
factors: satisfaction of the 
customer and 'fair' price of 
the seller's products, on 
customer's cross buying 
behavior. 
- Dynamic model 
utilizes research 
on satisfaction 
and subjective 
utility theory. 
- Database of 
large Dutch 
insurance 
underwriter (split 
into two periods) 
- Cherry 
picking 
- The impact of the factor: satisfaction, 
depends on the duration of the buyer-seller 
relationship. 
- Satisfaction may negatively impacts cross 
buying behavior of customers with short 
relationships with their sellers. 
- Unfair prices (on the part of the buyer) 
negatively impact customer's cross buying. 
- Customers with long relationships with 
their sellers are notable price sensitive and 
retention of 'fair' prices is crucial. 
- Focus only on 
insurance industry; 
add database of 
other companies/ 
industries. 
- Include the factor 
brand image. 
- Apply longitudinal 
measures of 
satisfaction and 
customer behavior. 
Reinartz and 
Kumar 2002, 
Harvard 
Business Review 
- Analysis of customer 
loyalty 
- To measure and question 
the correlation between 
loyalty and profitability. 
- Correlation is validated by 
testing three claims. 
- Evaluation of 
four companies' 
customer 
databases (in 
total 16,000 
individual, over a 
four year period) 
- Additional 
surveys with a 
sample of 
companies' 
- Cherry 
picking 
- Service 
demanders 
- High 
vulner-
ability to 
failure 
- Results of the three tested claims: 
(1) Long-lasting (loyal) customers are not 
cheaper to supply than short-lasting ones; 
loyal customers are aware of their impact 
and often request more service. 
(2) Loyal customers do not pay higher 
prices; again, customers know about their 
level of importance, so often ask for price 
discounts. 
(3) Loyal customers are not constraining 
active marketers, but to talk positively 
- Include more 
different company 
profiles, thereby 
cover further 
complexity and 
achieve universally 
valid statements. 
- Expand sample of 
the existing survey. 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
customers about the seller's performance is common. 
- Loyalty and profitability come not 
together, both have to be maintained 
separately. 
Reinartz and 
Kumar 2003, 
Journal of 
Marketing 
- To close the lack of studies 
which consider dynamic 
effects within a customer-
firm relationship over time 
(especially in non-
contractual relationships). 
- Proof of dynamic effects 
through empirical evidence 
(test related factors) 
- Understanding of 
customer's profitability and 
temporal dynamics to know 
which levers to be applied to 
retain and manage profitable 
customer 
- Framework for 
measuring 
profitable 
customer lifetime 
duration 
- Pareto/NBD 
(negative binomial 
distribution) 
model and 
survival analysis 
applied. 
- Same data used 
by Reinartz and 
Kumar (2000). 
- Cherry 
picking 
- Spending 
limiters 
- Service 
demanders 
- Descriptive results are achieved by 
evaluating short- and long-term records. 
- Common assumption that high-frequency 
purchasers are the most profitable cannot 
be verified. 
- From a long-term (lifetime) perspective, 
customers who buy with intermediate 
frequency are most likely the most 
profitable customers. 
- Longer lifetime customers have 
proportionally higher returns than shorter 
lifetime customers. 
- Return procedure could be used as lever 
to maintain customer. 
- More expensive, but also more effective 
service for longer lifetime customers. 
- Profitable customer with low share-of-
wallet (spending limitation) to be 
approached through up- and cross-selling. 
- Extend data basis 
across further 
industries. 
- Inclusion of trends 
in purchase behavior 
- Implementation of 
two-step modeling 
progression 
Mundt et al. 
2006, Journal of 
Consumer 
Marketing 
- Analyze cross-category 
loyalty and its impact for 
multiproduct companies 
organized in product-
- Five applicable 
loyalty metrics 
were deployed. 
- Data extracted 
- High 
vulner-
ability to 
failure 
- Loyalty does not significantly increase by 
spending capital into CRM and cross selling 
strategies. 
- Offering more products/ services does not 
- Restricted 
geographical scope 
of the interviews 
(Australia only) 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
oriented business divisions. 
- Make related insights 
available to managers and 
researchers. 
from two 
verticals, banking 
and insurance via 
telephone 
interviews. 
- Com-
petitive vs. 
cross 
selling 
ensure a competitive edge. 
- With respect to the analyzed verticals, the 
number of customers switching providers is 
marginal. 
- Limited companies 
considered 
- Expand scope by 
including further 
product categories, 
enterprises and 
countries. 
Du et al. 2007, 
Journal of 
Marketing 
- To disclose an approach 
illustrating the commerce a 
customer does with the 
competition. 
- Assessment of wallet size 
and share of wallet of a 
customer 
- Basis are internal records, 
complemented with a some 
external records. 
- Approach shall facilitate 
companies to explore and 
expand customer base. 
- 'List/ database 
augmentation' 
- Three models 
used to calculate 
the total 
purchases of the 
customer. 
- Data: major 
U.S. bank; 34,000 
customers across 
ten categories 
- Spending 
limiters 
- The size of wallet does not significantly 
depends on the duration of the relationship 
(longer relationship does not imply larger 
share of wallet). 
- It is likely that customers with a high 
share of wallet in one category also target a 
high share in another category. 
- Customers with higher incomes target to 
split share of requirements across firms, 
congruously the share of wallet. 
- Data sample is 
based on one U.S. 
bank only. 
- Adapt framework 
to other industries. 
Duclos et al. 
2007, McKinsey 
Quarterly 
- Highlighting some potential 
resistance to cross selling 
success 
- Offering a practical 
example how to refocus the 
sales force to cross sell. 
- Practical 
consultancy 
project (of an 
industrial-
products 
company) serves 
as database for 
- High 
vulner-
ability to 
failure 
- To tackle issues (e.g. risk aversion, 
lacking incentives) that hindered cross 
selling success, the company developed a 
series of uncommon workshops (e.g. about 
tolerance for risk, reflection of career 
moments, motivations at work) for sales 
forces. 
- Limited database 
applied 
- Scientific analysis 
pending 
- Extend database 
by evaluating 
further projects. 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
the evaluation. - Past experience and established beliefs 
were challenged. 
- New trust was built up and compensation 
structure set up, cross selling success was 
initiated. 
- Provide scientific 
validation of 
practical results 
(e.g. through expert 
interviews). 
Kamakura 
2008, Journal of 
Relationship 
Marketing 
- Underlining pros and cons 
of cross selling 
- Evaluation of analytical 
tools which measure cross 
selling potential 
- Requirements gathering: 
what is crucial for successful 
cross selling deployment 
- Extensive 
literature research 
with focus on 
practical studies 
- E.g. global 
leader in 
workplace 
learning ask 
sample of 1,624 
consumers about 
cross selling 
experience 
- High 
vulner-
ability to 
failure 
- Com-
petitive vs. 
cross 
selling 
- The potential to earn better margin 
through cross selling bears the risk that 
companies overwhelm their customers with 
offerings, subsequently annoy and possibly 
lose them (risk of “over-touching” the 
customer). 
- Target customers need to be identified and 
suitable products to be offered at the right 
time. 
- Existing analytical tools can be clustered 
in: 'Acquisition Pattern Analysis' (identifies 
customer's next need) and 'Collaborative 
Filtering' (serves corresponding need). 
- Requirements for cross selling success: 
customer database/ contact management 
across business units available; incentive 
structure across products set up; top down 
management with dedication to cross selling 
- Overall goal: be customer-, not product-
centric (avoids “over-touching” the 
customer) 
- Mentioned 
requirements are 
not underpinned 
with scientific work. 
- Focusing on 
financial services 
and their maturity 
- Apply approach 
(technical 
evaluation) on 
different industry 
verticals. 
Kumar et al. - Identification of customers' - Literature - Spending - Drivers identified: average interpurchase - Dependence and 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
2008, Journal of 
Retailing 
motivation and drivers of 
cross buying (in non-
contractual settings) 
- Establish understanding 
about target customers 
(customers who are most 
likely to cross buy). 
- Evaluating the impact of 
marketing efforts of the 
seller on cross buying. 
- Determination of cross 
buying's impact on 
company's revenue 
- Add value, firstly, by 
closing research gap and, 
secondly, by paving the way 
to set up more effective 
cross selling approaches. 
research of cross 
buying drivers 
- Empirical study 
applies 
transaction data 
and firm–
customer 
interaction data 
(period 1997 - 
2004) from large 
catalog retailer 
(seven major 
product 
categories) 
limiters 
- Cherry 
picking 
time, ratio of product returns, and focused 
buying 
- Customers who purchase at intermediate 
interval are more likely to cross buy, thus 
cross selling target customers. 
- Bond customers based on marketing offers 
(here: direct mailings), so they remain 
longer with the company, trust in- and risk 
decreases, with the goal that they develop 
to intermediate interval customers. 
- For the same data an increased number of 
product returns on cross buying was 
detected. 
- Product returns imply a significant 
mismatch between customer's requirements 
and company’s solutions, cross selling might 
have a negative impact on company's 
revenue. 
- Efficient return process might be an 
opportunity to improve trust and maintain 
customers, as well as to discourage 
excessive return behavior. 
interaction between 
company's 
marketing effort, 
Customer Lifetime 
Value and cross 
buying was 
inadequately 
modeled. 
- Future research 
with focus on B2B 
environment 
Reinartz et al. 
2008, Journal of 
Interactive 
Marketing 
- Investigation of the 
relationship between cross 
buying and behavioral 
loyalty (i.e. consumer 
behaviors that characterize 
- Two data 
records: 1) 
German-based 
direct mail book 
retailer (50 
- Spending 
limiters 
- High 
vulner-
ability to 
- Cross buying is a consequence and not an 
antecedent of behavioral loyalty. 
- Behavioral loyalty decides how many 
products a company cross buys and how 
much the company spends on these 
- Paper ignores the 
impact of a possible 
third factor that 
might induce both, 
cross buying and 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
more loyal consumers) 
- To clarify if cross buying 
induces loyal behavior of the 
company or vice versa. 
- To highlight the 
dependency between 
consumer behavior and 
loyalty. 
categories, 
11,232 
households across 
four years), 2) 
U.S. catalog 
retailer (six 
categories, 2,401 
households across 
three years) 
- Granger-type 
causality modeling 
(statistical model) 
failure 
- Service 
demanders 
- Cherry 
picking 
products. 
- Customers buying from different business 
units are not causally more valuable 
customers. 
- Strong established customer relationship 
is the key, before applying cross selling. 
- Customers having high affinity towards 
the company and fit regarding company's 
product offerings shall be approached by 
cross selling. 
- Cross selling shall not be deployed, if 
additional product does not spend added 
value. 
- Cross selling shall not only focus on how 
many products from different business units 
are bought, but also how the customer 
distributes his total spend across the units. 
- Company shall target to cross sell higher 
margin categories. 
behavioral loyalty. 
- Granger causality 
test might be limited 
with respect to the 
choice of lag length. 
- Research is limited 
to two data records. 
 Expand set 
beyond retailing 
industry. 
- Categories were 
looked at separately. 
 Establish category 
clusters. 
- Verify results by 
conducting a fully 
controlled 
experiment. 
Shah and 
Kumar 2012, 
Harvard 
Business 
Review; 
extended paper 
published as: 
Shah et al. 
- Sensitization and 
communication of cross 
selling risks, inefficiencies 
and negative consequences 
- To introduce four distinct 
types of unprofitable 
customers. 
- Introduction of four hints 
- First data set: 
36 company 
managers across 
industries (within 
retail, high tech, 
communication, 
finance sector) in 
the U.S. and 
- Service 
demanders- 
Spending 
limiters 
- Cherry 
picking 
- Result of first data set: due to the 
execution of cross selling, average effort per 
customer-profit increased; convincing 
customers to cross buy turns out to be 
unprofitable for the company. 
- Results of second data set: in average, 
profit from cross buying customers is higher 
compared to non-cross buying customers; 
- Expand the time 
horizon of the data 
set and include 
more demographic 
variables. 
- Take additional 
industries into 
account. 
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Study, 
Journal 
Research purpose 
Research 
method 
Impacting 
factor 
category 
Key findings 
Limitations/ 
Future research 
2012, Journal of 
Marketing 
regarding how to cross sell 
right 
- Support the management 
to avoid cross selling losses. 
Europe were 
interviewed 
- Second data set: 
5 Fortune 1,000 
companies; data 
collected over 
periods from 4-7 
years; covering 
finance, retail and 
IT industries 
every fifth cross buying-customer is 
unprofitable (i.e. 70% of total loss 
generated with these customers). 
- Four types of unprofitable customers: (1) 
Service demanders (customer buys more 
products, but demand for service grows 
disproportionately.) (2) Revenue reversers 
(customer buys more products, but returns 
increases.) (3) Promotion maximizers 
(customer buys more products, but only at 
reduced prices.) (4) Spending limiters 
(customer buys more products, but does 
not spend more money, redistributes 
expenses.) 
- Four hints for right cross selling: (1) Set 
internal incentives (regarding company's 
sales forces) and external incentives 
(regarding potential cross buying customer) 
right. (2) Select and invest in the right 
customers. (3) Block and eliminate 
unprofitable customers. (4) Define new 
metrics: concentrate on overall customer 
profitability, not on cross sold products. 
- Add further types 
of unprofitable 
customers, e.g. 
customers who often 
claim damages or 
require complex 
policy conditions. 
Table 7: Critical studies of cross selling 
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We will use the following pages to review the selected papers in more detail. 
Reasons for selection were either the practical value of the papers or the high 
academic standard and depth of the analysis of the articles. Depending on the 
related selection criterion, the focus of the review will be on the papers' 
methodology and future research potential or on the articles' key findings. All in 
all four papers will be summarized. 
One of the common beliefs is that in contractual relationships it is 
advantageous to retain customers over the long term (Sheth and Parvatiyar 
1995, Bendapudi and Berry 1997). A typical example of a contractual relation is 
a mobile phone service provider. Regular payment by and access to the 
customer are guaranteed and customer data is available at any time. The 
article, “On the Profitability of Long-Life Customers in a Noncontractual Setting: 
An Empirical Investigation and Implication for Marketing” written by Reinartz 
and Kumar (2000), questions if this common belief is also valid in a 
noncontractual setting between seller and buyer. In noncontractual relations, 
the customer needs to be acquired constantly. Grocery stores are an example 
and belong to this type of relationship. The outcome of the research work 
illustrates, that in noncontractual relationships “long-life customers are not 
necessarily profitable customers”. The following summary will focus on the 
papers' methodology, more precisely on two of the four different propositions 
formulated by the authors. The propositions and their associated test results 
will be described. Although, this study does not refer to cross selling as such, 
the paper's results disclose that a basic assumption for successful cross selling, 
i.e. long-life customers are profitable, has been partly destabilized. The first of 
the two selected propositions claims that “the costs of serving long-life 
customers are lower”. After evaluating a data set from a traditional U.S. catalog 
retailer, in total 9'167 households over three years were considered, the 
proposition can be refuted. Nonetheless, the authors could figure out that the 
efficiency to supply customers' requests and requirements improves with 
growing customer turnover. The second proposition, “Long-life customers pay 
higher prices”, could also not be verified. The test results highlight that the 
short-term customer does react less sensitively to price increases than the 
long-term customer does. It is assumed that long-life customers are very 
familiar with the company's offerings, so they might be able to switch to a 
similar, but cheaper product offered by the company. 
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The second paper, which we will review in more detail, finds its strength in the 
practical orientation. Reinartz and Kumar (2002) explore the dynamics of 
customer loyalty and highlight “The Mismanagement of Customer Loyalty” (this 
is also the title of the article). As the underlying data for their research, 
Reinartz and Kumar received information from over 16'000 customers. Hereto 
four companies' customer databases have been used (across the following four 
industries: high tech, transportation, retail and finance). The data were 
collected over a time period of four years. Again, cross selling is not part of the 
research, but loyalty, another main condition for successful cross selling, is 
critically questioned. Reinartz and Kumar (2002) come to the conclusion that 
companies have to rate their customer according their level of loyalty and 
profitability and not only on the former. Based on these ratings, the company 
can decide which customer is worth investing additional effort in to expand the 
existing business, e.g. by cross selling. In total, the paper discusses the 
following three claims: (a) “It costs less to serve loyal customers”, (b) “Loyal 
customers pay higher prices for the same bundle of goods” and (c) “Loyal 
customers market the company”. The tests regarding claim (a) indicate that 
especially the long-term customers request additional service without intending 
to pay for this. In most cases, the reason for this is that the customers are 
aware of their power and impact on the company. Hence the customer is often 
well positioned when it comes to prize- or service level negotiations. Also 
proposition (b) cannot be confirmed. Quite the opposite, long-term customers 
are familiar with the company's product portfolio and associated pricing; 
consequently, they are better able to weigh the pros and cons than casual 
customers. It sounds fairly logical, customers who have bought products from 
the same company for years, also promote “their” company, e.g. through word 
of mouth. This is not as self-evident as it may seem: although claim (c) is valid, 
the tests show that the bond between the loyalty level of the customer and the 
frequency of promoting the company is not significant. All in all, the tests 
demonstrate that the correlation between the longevity of the customer and the 
originated earnings cannot meet the expectations. The quintessence of the 
article is: the companies need to concentrate on loyalty and profitability of the 
customer simultaneously, instead of the either or alternative. 
The paper “Size and Share of Customer Wallet” from Du et al. was published in 
the A+ journal, 'Journal of Marketing', in 2007.The authors' objective is to 
create a model, which can calculate the (still available) budget of the customer. 
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Based on this knowledge, the company is able to roll out strategic and specific 
business development activities toward the customer, e.g. cross selling 
initiatives. In addition the company identifies customers with available budget 
and could concentrate on approaching these more attractive customers. The 
model utilizes internal data and enriches the data set by adding a (small) set of 
external numbers. The reason for adding external data is obvious. The 
methodology should allow for identifying the share of budget the customer 
spends for competitors' products. In science, the method of synchronizing, 
overlapping and interfering internal and external data volume is known as “list 
augmentation” or “database augmentation”. Du et al. were able to get access 
to, and use a data set, which includes more than 34,000 bank customers. The 
bank, which made this data record available, has ten different options in its 
portfolio of financial products. The same product types are offered by its 
competitors. The applied list augmentation approach (i.e. the provided data set 
was pooled with internal data) and the associated tests resulted in four major 
outcomes. Firstly, the following important assumption for profitable cross 
selling is not correct: the longer the relationship with a customer the more 
budget the customer spends. Only in six of the ten product types could the 
tests confirm this claim. Secondly, it was evaluated that customers spending a 
large part of their budget for one product type, are also willing to invest a large 
part of their budget for an additional product. In this case, the tests evidently 
underline the potential of cross selling initiatives, utilized as a specific business 
development instrument. Thirdly, in some cases the decision taken by the 
customer to spend a certain part of its budget on a company’s product was 
made independently to its corporate procurement strategy. These customers, in 
particular, may promise business potential for the future. A higher share of the 
customer's budget could be gained by approaching the customer's corporate 
procurement department. Fourthly, the tests show that customers, following 
diversification-oriented strategies, often distribute their budget among different 
companies. In particular, customers with higher budget, but so far less 
diversification, could be approached, so that companies benefit from customer's 
intention to allocate its budget. From a cross selling perspective this might be 
beneficial for some companies and detrimental to others. 
The last paper we introduce in more detail is more practically than scientifically 
oriented. “Cross-Selling: Offering the Right Product to the Right Customer at 
the Right Time” was written by Wagner A. Kamakura in 2008. The article 
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provides a definition of cross selling and underlines the pros and cons of this 
sales methodology. Additionally the author introduces some of the analytical 
tools to measure cross selling potential. In conclusion, Kamakura lists the 
prerequisites and conditions to make cross selling a success story. In the 
following, we will summarize only the key statements of the paper. Here we try 
to mainly focus on the critical sections regarding cross selling, e.g. when 
companies ignore the 'Value Based Selling' concept. In the past, transactions 
were processed by direct human communication. This changed over time. Now, 
most of the transactions are facilitated by information systems. This 
development also influenced the way cross selling is practiced. Analytical tools 
support the whole sales process by evaluating past sales orders and collecting 
customer and market data. The author states, that “modern cross-selling is not 
necessarily done in a context with frequent person-to-person interactions, it 
has to be more event and value-driven than the more persuasive cross-selling 
of the past”. According to studies, the probability that cross selling efforts pay-
off is greater, if the customer takes the first move to contact the selling 
company, instead if the company contacts the customer and proactively 
approached them with cross selling. One of the reasons is that the customer 
might call the company to clarify a problem, assuming this problem was fixed, 
the customer satisfaction leads to the point that the customer is potentially 
more willing to buy another product. Some companies, especially financial 
institutions, are so successful in using this additional 'sales channel', so that 
they are able to restructure their call centers from cost centers to profit 
centers. Kamakura notes: “The focus in these profit centers is to first resolve 
the customers' problem and then make a cross-selling suggestion”. One 
example when cross selling could be counterproductive is, if the sales force 
mainly focuses on selling additional products. The cross selling idea does not 
succeed, because the seller fails to devote sufficient attention to solving 
customer's problems, i.e. companies do not pay heed to 'Value Based Selling' 
efforts, but only striving for selling more products services. Two groups of 
analytical tools for cross selling are introduced in the article, 'Acquisition 
Pattern Analysis' and 'Collaborative Filtering'. Both tools concentrate on pattern 
formation and recognition. They evaluate past behavior of the related customer 
and additionally analyze previous activities of other customers to determine 
cross selling potentials. The latter tool, 'Collaborative Filtering', focuses on 
direct interconnections between the possible cross selling products. In this case 
we assume the following: a customer buys a merchandise product from her 
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favorite soccer club from an online retailer, now the tool would consequentially 
recommend another product from this club. However, the other tool, 
'Acquisition Pattern Analysis' considers the sequence of purchases – it discovers 
“the next logical step for the customer”. Here we can provide the following 
example: this time a customer buys a dinnerware set. Subsequent to the 
purchase or even before the purchase is completed; the online retailer also 
offers a suitable flatware and glassware set on top. Kamakura concludes as 
follows: “In summary, aside from the technological investments, senior 
management must encourage company-wide dedication to cross-selling, 
demonstrated by incentives to encourage employees to share data and to add 
the selling function to their normal functions, and by the discipline to measure 
results in real time and reward employees based on them”. 
To provide a further level of detail, we have deployed an evaluation of the 
studies listed in table 5. The studies are allocated across the matrix below. In 
Figure 12, we assign the studies according to, firstly, their academic rank and, 
secondly, their practical impact. The classification regarding academic rank is 
made based on the VHB-JOURQUAL ranking (Hennig-Thurau and Schrader 
2008).The ranking categories range from paper published in an A+ journal to E 
ranked journals. The evaluation of the practical impact of the studies was built 
on subjective assessment that was originated during the literature research and 
by walking through selected papers thoroughly. 
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Figure 12: Evaluation of the critical studies of cross selling 
Regardless of column 'insignificant' – what becomes clear from the allocation in 
Figure 12 is the relative lack of studies mapped to the upper right quadrants. 
The paper Shah et al. 2012, published in 'Journal of Marketing', seems to be an 
exception. A compressed version of this paper (listed as Shah and Kumar 2012) 
was also issued in Harvard Business Review – this journal is known for 
publishing articles, which target to improve the practice of management. The 
lack of top-ranked papers, which also have a strong practical link, is not 
surprising, considering that several papers discuss the associated topic 'rigor 
vs. relevance' (Armstrong 2003a, Armstrong 2003b, Lehmann 2003, 
Rossiter2003).To identify if articles are important, often their results and 
applied method/model are evaluated in the light of the following criteria: 
replication, validity, usefulness and surprise (Armstrong 2003a). The first two 
criteria, replication and validity, may be fallen in the category 'rigor'. Top-
ranked journals are mostly characterized by following this category. That 
implies, that the findings of their published articles have to be replicable, i.e. 
the usage of same procedures obtains similar results (Armstrong 2003a). 
Additionally, precise conceptual definitions have to be set and absolutely 
accurate measurement has to be applied (Rossiter 2003). Clear focus of these 
journals is on accuracy of the method and model. The other two criteria, 
Practical Impact
major significantminorinsignificant
Shah et al. 2012
Kumar et al. 2008
Kamakura 2008; Shah 
and Kumar 2012
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em
ic
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A+
A
B
C
D
E
Reinartz and Kumar 
2000; Reinartz and 
Kumar 2003; Du et al. 
2007
Verhoef et al. 2001
Reinartz et al. 2008
Duclos et al. 2007
Mundt et al. 2006
Dowling and Uncles 
1997; Reinartz and 
Kumar 2002
Optimal Incentives to Foster Cross Selling: An Economic Analysis 74 
 
 
usefulness and surprise, are found in the second category, 'relevance'. 
Generally, fewer academic journals concentrate on this category. Here, key is 
that their published articles provide practical recommendations to enterprises, 
customers and governments. These articles are also well-known for applying 
new or innovative methodologies (Armstrong 2003a). 
In the next sections, we develop the groundwork for future research/modeling 
by incorporating the identified cross selling inadequacies in the literature. To 
extend our existing framework (Section 3) and modeling (Section 4) 
respectively, we expand our underlying findings and set of functions by taking 
the main points of cross selling criticism into account and adjust the framework 
(Section 7) and extend the model (Section 8) accordingly. 
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7 Conceptual Model Adjustment 
Based on the content of part A of this work, the idea and purpose of 
installing cross selling seem to be obvious. The basic assumption is that selling 
extended product and service offerings to already present customers adds 
significant value for both parties, here management/business units and key 
account. The key account profits from the more customized one-stop solution 
while saving expenditures for transactions. The selling party, consisting of 
management and business units, benefits from increasing revenue and profit 
share per customer. Cornelsen (2000) claims that executing cross selling is so 
beneficial because only marginal costs per additional volume of sales accrue. 
Customer relationships, trust and selling channels have already been 
established and existing capacities are already familiar to each other. An 
efficient working environment is in place. Cross selling intends to safeguard and 
extend current customer relationships, because selling additional products and 
services results in customer retention through increased switching cost for the 
customer. Less customer fluctuation predicts sustainable business growth rates 
for the seller. 
However, often the possible negative effects that can arise with cross 
selling are not considered by the selling party. Generally speaking, when 
companies decide to deploy a cross-selling strategy, they reflect on high risks 
and possible costs, due to ongoing market fluctuations, unpredictable 
circumstances and unstable market conditions (Duclos et al. 2007). This section 
adjusts and expands the conceptual model of Section 3 by considering the 
specialized risks and inefficiencies of cross selling, which may occur. 
Despite all the benefits of cross-selling, Mundt et al. (2006) analyzed 
that many companies still have economic and financial troubles exhausting their 
cross-selling potential completely, and more important efficiently. For their 
analysis, the authors used five relevant loyalty metrics and selected multiple 
loyalty measures with data collected from two service industries, banking and 
insurance. This data was gathered through telephone interviews. It was shown 
by their study that investments into CRM and cross selling programs appear to 
have less impact than was often assumed. Mundt et al. (2006) finally 
recommend being reserved when it comes to setting targets regarding winning 
additional business through cross selling. 
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In addition to this analysis, Shah and Kumar (2012) conclude their 
study, to their knowledge the first of its kind, by claiming that pushing 
customers to cross buy often results in a loss-making business for the selling 
company. In short, they clarify the fact that the average profit through cross 
selling is much higher than the loss by applying this sales strategy. But they 
also confirm that especially those customers who were “persuaded” to cross 
buy create significant losses for the selling company. Persuading these 
customers causes an increase in marketing costs. This coupled with production 
costs often eliminates the additional turnover won through cross selling. 
According to the authors' empirical findings, one in five cross buying customers 
is running at a loss. In scope of Shah's and Kumar's study are customer data 
sets of five Fortune 1'000 companies: a B2B financial services company, a B2B 
IT services company, a retail bank, a catalog retailer, and a fashion retailer. 
The survey covered a time period of four to seven years. In total, the 
unprofitable customers make up about 70% of the company's total “customer 
loss” (Shah and Kumar 2012). 
The available literature illustrates that cross selling is non-beneficial 
for the seller if one or more of the following characteristics (without any claim 
to comprehensiveness) apply: firstly, with an increased amount of purchased 
products the buyer asks for more and improved customer service. This demand 
is often excessive and thus disproportionately costly (Dowling and Uncles 1997, 
Reinartz and Kumar 2000). Secondly, the evaluated data show that in return 
the buyers request for credits, neglecting to repay loans or return previously 
purchased products (Petersen and Kumar 2009, Reinartz and Kumar 2003). 
Thirdly, the empirical studies by Du et al. (2007) and Kumar et al. (2008) 
emphasize the stagnated revenue of the seller due to the fact that often buyers 
have limited amount to spend. This means the total amount does not increase, 
but is allocated in a different way. 
Figure 13 utilizes the frame of figure 4 (see page 27) and highlights 
the identified impacting factors. These factors were already introduced in 
Section 6 and some of them are also touched in the paragraph above. Further 
detailed description will also follow during the next sections. The impacting 
factors underline why cross selling may turn out to be non-beneficial. All these 
impacting factors are making it increasingly difficult for the management to 
define the right incentives and to efficiently roll out a cross selling strategy 
which is profitable in the end. 
Optimal 
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business units and the mutual trust and relationship with their customers. 
Assuming the worst case, the company would lose their customer completely. 
Furthermore, there is also the risk that customers ask for disproportionately 
more service after they purchased a second or third product from the company. 
This would significantly influence the costs of the responsible business unit. In 
addition, we know from past literature (Schäfer 2002) that marketing efforts 
and investments are often needed to facilitate cross selling success. The 
support of the Management is required. Often, the challenge is to measure the 
value of marketing as well as to control the sales forces' activities. In regard to 
marketing, the success of cross selling is not only linked to the right promotion, 
but also dependent on the skill set of the force. Regarding the activities of the 
sales forces, primarily salesmen are very active on the market by meeting 
(potential) customers and thus their performance is hard to monitor 
(Panagopoulos and Avlonitis 2008). In the end, all that really counts are the 
number of products sold and the individual customer profitability. 
7.2 Level 2: Business Unit 1 and Business Unit 2 
This section of the thesis concentrates on the challenges which could 
occur in level 2; the way in which the business units interact with each other, 
underlines the risk of silo thinking and mutual mismanagement. 
Given diminishing economic growth and volatile markets and hence 
resulting negative profit development, it is even more difficult to expect 
collegial cooperation between separated business units. Each business unit 
focuses on its sales figures and market share and does not invest in products 
with which they are not familiar. This results in competitive selling rather than 
cross selling. This is precisely the reason why the management has to find a 
profit-sharing mechanism, where cross selling increases the profits of both 
business units. The condition is that the amount of profit-sharing is higher than 
the cost to gather and customize the necessary information and to sell the 
unfamiliar product. The engaged business units have to benefit from increasing 
revenue and be reimbursed for the information exchange they have performed. 
However, double compensation has to be avoided to keep the acquired business 
profitable. The current model under part A ('Cross Selling is Intrinsically 
Beneficial') assumes that when Business Unit 1 exerts effort to sell product 2, 
this has, firstly, zero effect on Business Unit 2's ability to sell its product, and 
secondly, no impact on Business Unit 2's utility. It seems to be much more 
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interesting to investigate both the negative and positive effects on the other 
business unit's selling productivity, when one business unit exerts effort to sell 
the other business unit's product. The main difference could be to make 
transfer payments for information sharing and newly won cross selling 
businesses. In sum, the right profit-sharing mechanism would increase the 
attractiveness of cross selling at the company. Nevertheless, the profit-sharing 
mechanism across all engaged business units may not affect existing customer 
responsibilities. To avoid any confusion and miscommunication towards the 
customer, it has to be clearly defined which business unit is in the lead position. 
On a related note, cross selling can cause damage, if overly motivated sales 
forces make excessive promises or sell additional products without creating 
added value for their customers. Concurrently, the cross selling potential has to 
be identified and the customer readiness be verified. As aforementioned, the 
sales forces' performance shall be measured against the profitability of their 
customers and not only against the number of products sold (Shah and Kumar 
2012). Finally, the business units' risk aversion needs to be considered. As 
shown in this section and also in the previous section (7.1), sales forces 
sometimes resist cross selling because it often appears to be risky. The 
advantages of cross selling (e.g. additional earnings, decreasing transactional 
cost) are countered by a strong fear of the business units (jeopardizing and 
losing the customer relationship). Therefore, the overall goal of the 
management should be to transform any competitive selling activities towards 
cross selling efforts. 
7.3 Level 3: Business Unit and Key Account 
This section highlights the approach and anxiety of the Business Unit 
as well as the concerns of the Key Account when it comes to cross selling. 
Based on the previous literature, two major concerns of the key 
account are due to stress. Firstly, Kamakura (2008) refers to a survey carried 
out in 2005 by Forum Corp., a Boston global leader in workplace learning, 
including data of 1624 clients globally. The survey results, among others, in the 
following statement: “Customers were most annoyed when service reps 
continue to sell after the customer says he is not interested, when they are 
obviously reading from a script, and they try to push products that are not 
useful to the customer”. One step towards solving or diminishing this problem 
respectively could be to implement reliable and convenient CRM software. 
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Further steps would be to invest more effort in training the sales forces and to 
define focus target customers. The second concern was identified by 
Dellaferrera (2003): the key account has to handle the uncertainty, if the 
business unit has the required capability to technically explain the unfamiliar 
product and if the cross sold product ultimately solves the customer's problem 
and thus spends additional value; or if the business unit only wants to sell an 
additional product. 
An advisable two-step approach for the business unit on how to steer 
its key account regarding cross selling could be derived by the analysis of 
Reinartz et al. (2008): firstly, before kicking off a major cross selling initiative 
the business unit needs to solidify and invest in the relationship with its key 
account; here trust is key. Secondly, instead of selling any product, the goal 
shall be to cross sell these products with higher margin (always provided that 
the product comes with added value). The study of Reinartz et al. (2008) is 
based on two data sets. The first data set comes from a German-based direct 
mail book retailer; the second from a large U.S. catalog retailer. An additional 
outcome from this study is that cross-selling strategies can exploit maximum 
potential if the focus is not only on selling the various products of the business 
units, but also on the question of how the customer share is distributed across 
the business units. Often this share is unequally distributed and this allows 
inferences that the total potential is not yet exploited completely. Therefore, 
the authors come to the conclusion that cross selling will not lead, as often 
shown, to more valuable customers. 
This concern of not gaining more valuable customers can be justified 
by the following reasons: the previously mentioned study (see Section 7) from 
Shah and Kumar (2012) discloses two customer behaviors which are 
responsible for cross selling not always being beneficial for the business unit. 
The first behavior refers to the customers called 'service demanders'. As 
mentioned in the previous two sections, it means that the more products the 
key account buys the more service they request. Often the key account asks for 
excessive customer service. This implies rising cost for the business unit. The 
second behavior of the customer is mapped to the term 'spending limiters'. 
‘Spending limiters’ are defined by Shah and Kumar (2012) as the customers 
that spend only a small, fixed amount with a given company. This may have 
various reasons, e.g. following a strategy to avoid concentration of risk. Due to 
this fixed amount, the Key Account would not spend more money if the 
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Business Unit promotes cross selling. The Key Account would only decide on a 
new split, i.e. the customer would spend x for product 1 and y for product 2, 
instead of x+y for product 1. Finally, these behaviors generates cross selling 
costs for the Management without increasing revenue. Viewed from another 
angle the profit would shift from one business unit to another. Assuming the 
fixed and limited amount of the Key Account, one unit would benefit and the 
other would lose (Du et al.2007, Kumar et al. 2008). In the end, there is the 
concern that the increase in profit from profitable cross selling businesses is not 
high enough to offset these unprofitable cross selling engagements. Another 
reason cross selling is not always beneficial for the business unit is highlighted 
by Benady (2004). The author refutes the common understanding that it is 
more advantageous to sell further products to the existing customers instead of 
acquiring new customers. In addition, he claims the company does not 
necessarily gain from selling several products to the same customer. Due to the 
fact that customers often only cross buy if a discount is offered. This behavior is 
known as 'cherry picking'. More precisely, key accounts contribute to a greater 
extend to the company's revenue; as a result they have reached a special 
position within the company. Key accounts repeatedly use this position to claim 
for first-class service and price discounts. Past surveys document that it is 
common understanding, firstly, that key accounts deserve lower prices 
(Reinartz and Kumar 2002) and, secondly, that the company has to add value 
while practicing cross selling (Mohs 1999). In addition, key accounts are often 
very familiar with the company's service portfolio, pricing and commercial 
models, so that they can easily benchmark the offerings and judge about the 
created added value (Reinartz and Kumar 2002). 
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8 Extension of the Model 
In order to provide a more realistic picture, some risks and hazards as 
to why cross selling may prove to be non-beneficial will be included in the 
model. In this section, the underlying model (more precisely the associated 
functions) of Section 4 will be extended with regard to the impacting factors 
listed in the previous chapter. These are also summarized in figure 13 (page 
77). 
We assume cross selling is executed. To illustrate the dependency as 
well as the positive and negative effects which can occur when cross selling is 
practiced, we once more consider the two utility functions of the Business Unit  ∈ tZJ ( , ( v; where either the Business Units cooperate by exchanging 
the essential information, or only one Business Unit cooperates and the other 
Business Unit defects and keeps the necessary cross selling information private 
and thus saves the cost of sharing information. Both scenarios are described in 
detail under level 2.On a side note: here we ignore the utility ZJ, because we 
focus on the Business Unit which is willing to cross sell and additionally ZJ is 
gained in one period only. Now we distinguish between the two types of 
Business Units _ ∈ t, ℎv, wherein the first type has low and the second high 
motivation to achieve success in cross selling. Here it is assumed that the 
Management is aware of the fact that two different types exist, but the 
allocation of these types is unknown. Only the Business Units know which type 
they are. As described in Section 3.4.1, two forms of asymmetric information 
can be distinguished. In contrast to level 1 (Section 3.1), we do not currently 
focus on 'moral hazard' (homogeneous individuals), but on 'adverse selection' 
(heterogeneous individuals). In this case, the Management often aims to 
accomplish a 'self-selection' of the different types; also called 'screening' 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Wilson 1977). In addition, we include the 
probability of the respective event, with ^ being that the Business Units 
cooperate and cross selling occurs. The following applies: 0 <  <  < 1. We 
assume the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function %∙& with > > 0 and >> < 0. Thus the expected utility of type _ is: ^%ZJ ( , ( & ' ^%ZJ ( & ,%1 ( ^&% ( &. Due to the assumed risk aversion of the Business Units, the 
expected utility is less than the utility of the expected value, =^%∙&" < ^=%∙&". 
Based on these conditions, the expected profit of the Management, with a 
Business Unit of type _, is: 
^%
ZJ, 
& ' ^
ZJ , %1 ( ^&
. Here it is assumed that 
the Management is risk neutral and that the realized profit is equal to the 
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expected profit, 
^%∙& ' =
^%∙&". Switching back to moral hazard, i.e. ignoring the 
different types of Business Units, but keeping the probability, the expected 
utility of an average Business Unit would be in general: %ZJ ( , ( & '%ZJ ( & , %1 ( &% ( &. The expected profit of the Management would be 
%
ZJ, 
& ' 
ZJ , %1 ( &
. 
In addition to the general adjustment regarding the form of the 
asymmetric information above, we will further modify the payment function 2%?, @&3, which will include an expansion of the sales revenue function 2?K@%?, @&3, and we will propose a possible new cost function of the Business 
Unit 2%?, @&3. These modifications will cover the abovementioned impacting 
factors G ('Competitive vs. cross selling': Needed profit-sharing and transfer 
payments) and H ('Service demanders': Excessive (and often unreasonable) 
demands for customer service). The new payment and the new cost function 
will form the updated utility function of the Business Unit. The profit function of 
the Management 2
ZJ%, 	, ?, @&3 will be impacted by these adjustments (mainly 
by the expansion of the sales revenue function) and updated accordingly. The 
new profit function will illustrate the factor F (Higher vulnerability to failure). 
Recalling the underlying payment function %?, @& '  , %?& +  ,%@& + 	; we need to imbed the profit-sharing idea into the expanded function. 
Fixed salary and the revenue shares, which are determined according to the 
level of incentives, currently drive the sum of the payment to the Business Unit. 
Now it has to be respected that the Business Unit exerts effort to sell the other 
business unit’s product and therefore impacts the utility function of the other 
Business Unit as well, and vice versa. This can be approached by the following 
updated payment function, which can be shown as: %?, @& '  , 2∑  %?&}? 3 +  , 2∑  %@&}? 3 + 	, with  as the number 
of business units within the company which are entitled to cross sell. In the 
current model we assume  ' 2, but this number can be extended as arbitrary 
– taking into account that an incentive parameter per product might to be 
added. The new payment function ensures, that Business Unit 1 also derives 
benefits from the cross selling activities of Business Unit 2 and vice versa. This 
captures the impacting factor G ('Competitive vs. cross selling': Needed profit-
sharing and transfer payments). However, the Business Unit has also to carry 
additional cost and risk exposures, which is illustrated by the new revenue 
function. The former function ?K@%?, @& is replaced by the new revenue 
Optimal Incentives to Foster Cross Selling: An Economic Analysis 84 
 
 
function: ?K@ %?, @, ?, @& ' %? ( ?& + ?%?& ( ?%?& ( ?%?& , %@ ( @& +@%@& ( @%@& ( @%@&. The following setup applies to product 1 and product 2 
and the sum of both results in the new sales revenue: Price minus the 
production cost of the product, this multiplied by the quantity sold of the 
product, minus the new accruing service cost and the arising disruptive term. 
The literature underlines that with an increasing amount of purchased products, 
the customer requests additional service. The addition of the service cost 
functions ?%?& and @%@& meets this finding and represents the impacting 
factor H ('Service demanders': Excessive (and often unreasonable) demands for 
customer service). However, there is not currently any research available which 
highlights this rising service demand with figures. The service cost depends 
greatly on the complexity and reliability of the product. The Management might 
extract the necessary figures from the company's CRM data. Here we assume 
the generic functions ?%?& '  + %? , a?& and @%@& '  + %@ , a@&, where  and  
serve as scaling parameters; ,  ∈ 0,∞". The considered service costs also 
motivate the Business Units to transfer excessive service demanders (i.e. high-
maintenance customers) to programs with lower-cost customer service, such as 
the Internet. As we will see in Section C, the Management is able to weight 
these costs. The latest customer service activities in the United States of 
America show there is the objective to educate customers in using online live 
chats, instead of service via phone. The ultimate goal would be that based on 
the Business Units' interventions the parameters  and  decrease towards 
zero. Additionally, it cannot be presumed, that every cross selling action is 
successful, failures may occur. Some customers might be dissatisfied with the 
cross sold product and therefore complain and return the product to the 
Business Unit. The value of the returned products is illustrated by ¡2¡3 ' ¡ +¡, with ¢ ' 1,2 and ¡ ∈ 0,∞. ¡ stands for the number of returned products. 
Again, significant research, here regarding the probability of cross selling 
failure, is missing. On the researcher's part, it can be assumed that such 
information is for internal company use only and due to its confidentiality not 
intended to be accessible for research. On the Management's part, CRM data 
can be analyzed and added to further expand the realism of the model. To 
simplify the model, we can suppose =£¡¤ ' 0. Another option is to superficially 
translate the research result from Shah and Kumar (2012), described in Section 
7. According to their empirical outcome (one in five cross buying customers is 
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running at a loss) and assuming  ' 2, we could consider the following 
function: ¡2¡3 ' ??F + ¡2¡3 + ¡, ¢ stands for each cross sold product. 
With respect to the new cost function, we extend the current function 
%?, @& ' ?@ ?@ , @@ by adding a further cost component. Assuming Business 
Unit 1, the cost to sell product 1 as well as to gather and customize the 
information about product 2 and finally to sell it are already considered. But the 
effort to pass on the needed information about its product to Business Unit 2 is 
not presently defined. In the previous sections, we simply implied that the 
Business Unit receives all necessary information from the other unit to be able 
to sell the unfamiliar product (Section 4.2), or we introduced  as a fixed but 
minor cost element (Section 4.3). In the new cost function, the cost depends 
on Business Unit 2's motivation and the effort they expend to cross sell. That 
implies, the more effort Business Unit 2 spends on cross selling activities, the 
more information about the unfamiliar product is requested, and consequently 
has to be provided by Business Unit 1. The upgraded function could be 
described as follows: %?, @& ' ?@ ?@ , @@ , ^¡. Based on the current setup 
of the model, we assume ^ ' ?, i.e. the effort attached to product 1; more 
precisely the effort of passing on information of product 1 to Business Unit 2, 
and ¡ as the effort which the business unit, here Business Unit 2, expends on 
cross selling; due to the given symmetry of the model, this leads to ¡ ' @. 
Again, multiplied by a scaling parameter  ∈ 0,∞". This scaling parameter can 
be indirectly influenced by the Management, e.g. by facilitating information 
exchange (for further details, see Section C). 
Based on the adjustments above, the new utility function of the 
Business Unit is: ZJ '  (  ' 2 , 2∑  %?&@}? 3 +  , 2∑  %@&@}? 3 + 	3 (I?@ ?@ , @@ , ?@Q. The new profit function of the Management 2
ZJ '?K@  (  (  (  ' 2%? ( ?& + ?%?& ( ?%?& ( ?%?& , %@ ( @& + @%@& (@%@& ( @%@&3 ( 2 , 2∑  %?&@}? 3 +  , 2∑  %@&@}? 3 + 	3 (  ( 3 includes 
the abovementioned impacting factor H. Harding (2002) researched the 
concept that vulnerability to failure is much higher when cross selling is applied. 
Here this is demonstrated by ¡2¡3, with ¢ ' 1,2. Every failed cross selling 
attempt impacts negatively, not just on the Management, but also on the 
Business Units. 
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Now we will analyze the impacting factors I ('Spending limiters': 
Limited amount due to small and/or share of wallet) and J ('Cherry picking': 
Cross buy if discount is offered). Both factors show the characteristics of the 
Key Account. Here the budget, as well as the buying patterns of the customer 
will be considered. Therefore, the part %^ ( ^& + ^%^&, with _ ' 1,2, . . , ¥ (here two 
business units, ¥ ' 2, hence _ ' 1,2) of the sales revenue function may be 
reconsidered. 
As illustrated in Section 7, sometimes buyers limit their budget per 
seller. This is often for the simple reason that they do not want to put 'all their 
eggs in one basket'. The limited amount can be illustrated by the following 
demand function of the customer: %?, @, … , & ' %?& , %@& , ⋯, %&, in the 
current setup with ¥ ' 2. At this time, we ignore the price of product 1 and 2 or 
assume the same price for both products. The total demand  would be 
predefined by the Key Account. Now, the additional revenue which can be 
generated through cross selling product 2 depends on the amount the Key 
Account already spent on product 1 and vice versa. Based on this, the 'net 
revenue' Business Unit 1 gains with product 1 would be %? ( ?& + 2%?, @& (@%@&3. In total, this leads to the updated revenue function: ?K@ %?, @, ?, @& ' %? ( ?& + 2%?, @& ( @%@&3 ( ?%?& ( ?%?& , %@ ( @& +2%?, @& ( ?%?&3 ( @%@& ( @%@&. The budget of the Key Account could be 
openly discussed, so that through a collaborative approach a tailored solution 
for the customer could be offered. If the budget is not disclosed by the 
customer, the Management might assume the total demand based on historical 
CRM data. This section covers the listed impacting factor I ('Spending limiters'). 
Previously ignored – the price is now the key aspect when it comes to 
impacting factor J ('Cherry picking'). Some studies (highlighted in Section 7.3) 
have shown that it is (to a certain extend) a common understanding to offer 
price discounts to the company's key accounts. In the model, this could be 
realized by adding new scaling parameters, which are directly determined by 
the Management: %? ( ?& and %¨@ ( @&, with , ¨ ∈ 0,1. , ¨ ' 1 Would be 
ensuring that no discount is granted. According to the market conditions, the 
Management could set or provide discounts by selecting a value between 0 ≤ , ¨ < 1. With the current model setup in mind, it is obvious that these 
parameters do not impact the quantity sold and the demand of the customer 
respectively. Expanding the sales quantity functions from ^%^& ' ^ , a^, with _ ' 1,2 to ?%?& ' ? , a? ( ? and @%@& ' @ , a@ ( ¨@ would exemplify the effect 
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of discounts. If the Business Unit does not spend any effort to sell product 1 
and to cross sell product 2 respectively, there will be no demand from the 
customer. But increasing sales efforts by the Business Unit stimulate the needs 
of the Key Account and this results in higher sales figures. Another driver for 
increasing ?%?& and @%@&, is the decrease in prices through discounts, i.e. , ¨ → 0. Finally, this would lead us to the following terms: %? ( ?& + %? , a? (?& and %¨@ ( @& + %@ , a@ ( ¨@&. 
To summarize: on the one hand, the numerous model enhancements, 
depicted above, provide the model with more realism. On the other hand, 
further layers of complexity are added. However, this complexity can be 
mastered by extracting key data out of the company's CRM tool, e.g. data 
regarding the rising service demand due to increasing amount of purchased 
products, data about the value of the returned products due to cross selling 
failures, or data with regard to the approximate total demand of the Key 
Account. If the CRM data are not available assumption should be made. 
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9 Outlook and Directions for Future Research 
The benefits and importance of cross selling are recognized by 
economists and business management. Scientists have emphasized these 
observations and appraisals in several studies. However, analytical studies that 
show how to best implement cross selling in multiproduct companies, which are 
organized in product-oriented business divisions, were missing. This thesis is a 
first step towards closing the gap in analytical studies. However, the 
possibilities for examining cross selling in a scientific manner are by no means 
exhausted. As outlook, future research projects, whether analytically or 
empirically conducted, will help implementing cross selling in practice more 
efficient, because adequate setups are often missing in the current business 
environment. Here amendments shall take place. Since future analysis and 
setups include parameters that closely reflect reality (e.g. risks and hazards 
which can occur while practicing cross selling), the models gain accuracy. 
On the one hand, future research can tackle the described limitations 
(see 5.3) of the model in part A ('Cross Selling is Intrinsically Beneficial'). 
Furthermore, the plausibility of the functions under part B ('Cross Selling may 
Turn out to be Non-Beneficial'), which include the risks and hazards of cross 
selling, can be verified and/or the setup expanded, e.g. by avoiding the 
assumptions that the business unit's base salary and the retail price (and thus 
the gross margin) for each product are fixed exogenously. Both could be 
derived instead of assumed. Regarding the retail price, future research can 
explore the design of pricing schemes as such (see also Section 10). Regarding 
Section B, here, extensive mathematical derivations and details are omitted on 
purpose. However in the next step, mathematical derivations are conducive to 
holistically constructing an incentive scheme for cross selling programs, which 
could then be introduced to companies. These measures lead to a scope 
extension of analytical studies. On the other hand, cross selling can be explored 
by the field of behavioral economics; it can investigate if the behavior of real 
people deviates significantly from that of the so-called 'homo economicus' in 
economic theory. In general, behavioral economics merges economics and 
experimental research. It questions if individuals maximize subjective expected 
utility and explores why people make irrational decisions from time to time 
(Selten 1990, Rubinstein 1998, Camerer 2006). 
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An interesting future research endeavor would be to empirically test 
the practical relevance of the analytical findings. This could be achieved by 
several approaches. A first approach could be to design appropriate laboratory 
tests of some of our key theoretical results. Secondly, empirical surveys in 
terms of questionnaire analysis would highlight the practical link. The 
participants of the survey should be the key parties of the model; management, 
business units and key accounts of an enterprise. Based on this, the 
interviewees can state their positions to the three levels where incentive 
problems occur. Thirdly, case studies can be utilized to practically test the 
analysis. To drive this intensive approach, companies need to be studied over 
time. Researchers require access to internal company data; company's data 
need to be evaluated and probably results to be shared with the public in 
general. This qualitative descriptive research form is powerful, if a close 
collaboration between enterprises and research institutions (e.g. universities) 
exists. So, data can be combined with academic methodology. A fourth 
approach to check the practicality of this subject and to elaborate managerial 
solutions is the execution of expert interviews in form of narrative or guided 
interviews. Interviewing customers would ensure that this as yet fairly 
unexamined area would be highlighted (Vyas 2008). The currently lack of 
awareness and information about experiences of the customers would be 
disclosed and would provide significant contributions both for theory generation 
and for developing valuable cross selling strategies. 
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similar manner as the previous scenario in Section 5.2. These scenarios are 
called 'Price Discount Strategy' and 'Customer Service Strategy'. 
Scenario 'Price Discount Strategy': With the goal of being more 
successful, measured through increasing sales revenue and/or rising market 
share, the Management lowers the product prices for their key accounts. This 
has several implications. In a high-level manner these implications are also 
pictured in figure 15. We assume that price discount is granted %, ¨ → 0&, in 
simple terms, ^ drops (see move 1 in figure 15). For the whole section _ ' 1,2 
applies. This drop in prices implies increasing ^ (see move 2), with ? '%? , a? ( ?& and @ ' %@ , a@ ( ¨@&. The sales growth could positively affect 
the revenue 2?K@  ↑	3; but being aware that %? ( ?& and %¨@ ( @& decrease, 
and ^ depends on the efforts the business unit expends (see next paragraph). 
Furthermore ^ and ^ are affected. Due to the decreasing ^ and the resulting 
increase of the quantity sold ^, the cost of customer service also rises (^%^& ↑, 
see move 3 in figure 15). This leads to lower revenue 2?K@  ↓	3. By contrast, 
the fall in prices decreases the value of returns (^ ↓, see move 4) and this 
increases the revenue 2?K@  ↑	3. In conclusion, we recognize that not every 
move positively impacts the sales revenue and the quantity sold mainly 
depends on the effort the business unit spends on selling the products. 
By linking our findings to the initial model (Section 4) and with regard 
to the derived optimal efforts (?∗ ' LN@P and @∗ ' LO\P), it could be assumed that the 
level of effort depends on the given price, so the price discount %^ ↓& would 
cause a decline in effort. This assumption is illustrated by move 5 and 6 of 
figure 15. If we suppose decreasing efforts, this would result in significant 
revenue losses; since the effort is key and determines the sales volume ? and @. In sum, it seems to be that the 'Price Discount Strategy' is not the right 
approach to increase sales revenue and/or to improve the market share. 
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10 Apart from Optimal Incentives: Further 
Prerequisites to be Considered 
On any rational basis, it is all about setting optimal incentives. But this 
is not, by any means, enough. The conditions, which have to be met to achieve 
cross selling success, are broader. In addition to those previously mentioned, 
we illustrate in the following a few more prerequisites. 
Firstly, the reputation of the cross selling company is key. A good 
reputation allows decisions making to be easier and thus costs can be saved. A 
strong company reputation reduces the customer's fears regarding cross selling 
measures and the underlying trust of the buyer towards the seller facilitates 
smooth negotiations (Ngobo 2004). Reputation is based on characteristics such 
as credibility, reliability, responsiveness, flexibility, price-performance ratio, and 
other factors. The company strengthens these characteristics through its 
product offerings. Integrating selected key accounts into the company's product 
development processes, i.e. rolling out product combinations, could enable the 
company to sell cross-selling solutions faster (Bell and Eisingerich 2007). 
Customers will be educated by this involvement and correspondingly, they 
receive solutions which are more or less tailored to their needs. In the end, 
services and products must be so attractive and easy to use that customers are 
interested in cross buying. The solution, product or service comes with a price 
tag. The price tags have to be thoroughly negotiated for cross-selling 
opportunities, because pricing impacts customers’ perceptions of 
trustworthiness. Verhoef et al. (2001) emphasize that often prices for long-
term and/or important customers, like key accounts, are lower than those for 
other customers. The authors highly recommend reviewing the company's 
commercial models and the related pricing schemes. It needs to be made clear 
for customers that through cross selling additional value is created and that this 
value has a price. The company is well advised to offer the same pricing to 
cross selling customers of the same peer group. In addition, prices shall be 
agreed on, before executing cross selling initiatives. To act faster and more 
flexibly, it could be an option to delegate the competence of pricing to the 
company-wide and cross-divisional sales force. This would avoid the often 
lengthy pricing negotiations between the business units. Caution must be 
recommended here: because the sales forces could make high price 
concessions in order to maximize their revenue share. 
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Secondly, it is of utmost importance to select and approach the right 
customers. But who are the right customers? (i) Those customers who have a 
high affinity toward the cross selling company, (ii) those whose requirements 
match the company’s product offerings and (iii) those key accounts which aim 
for long-term collaborations. Those customers get the most from buying 
additional products. And vice versa the selling company benefits the most from 
these customer engagements. Reinartz et al. (2008) empirically underline these 
prerequisites. They argue that affinity or loyalty needs to be present as much 
as market and customer data have to be considered and reviewed. The authors 
(Reinartz et al. 2008) highly recommend selecting the right customers, instead 
of indiscriminately selling to any customer. Sha and Kumar (2012) plead for 
asking the ultimate question: “Do we really want these customers?” To answer 
this question the company should evaluate whether it is worth investing in this 
customer, i.e. cross selling further products. How likely is it that the additional 
efforts pay off? These questions have to be answered before engaging in cross 
selling measures. Ultimately, cross selling has to deliver added value for both, 
buyer and seller. 
Thirdly, a further prerequisite is to apply the right marketing approach 
for different customers rather than rolling out a generalized marketing 
campaign across all the company’s customers. An empirical study has shown 
that, in particular those companies, who operate cross-selling successfully, 
inform their customers about relevant new cross-business unit products 
(Schäfer 2002). The clear message is: communicate your full offer and benefits 
to your customers. Savings and decreased work load can be realized by 
educating high-maintenance customers to use lower-cost customer service 
platforms like the internet. Here a marketing campaign to promote internet's 
ease of handling could be beneficial. Generally, an important aspect in the 
selection of the right marketing mix is to disclose the added value of cross-
selling products to the customer. 
Overall, it will never be possible for all cross selling activities to always 
be profitable. Occasionally, customers will affect a company's result negatively. 
Therefore, sellers still have to select and prioritize the target customers. Shah 
et al. (2012) empirically tested that the amount of customers creating 
unprofitable cross selling results for the companies are fairly small. 
Nevertheless, these customers are responsible for an excessively high degree 
of total losses from customers. Sometimes the success of cross selling is 
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measured wrongly. The most frequently applied metric for evaluating the 
success of cross selling campaigns is the 'cross buy-ratio' (Shah et al. 2012). 
The cross buy-ratio reflects the number of products from different business 
units which were sold to the customer. But as stated above, not every cross 
selling business creates additional profit for the company, therefore it is 
recommendable to measure and control each customer’s profitability instead of 
the growing turnover through cross selling (Shah et al. 2012). The customer’s 
profitability could be micromanaged by monitoring the development of each 
sold product. This should urge us to rethink the incentive schemes. The future 
schemes consider and incentivize the business units, firstly, with the amount of 
cross sold products and, secondly, based on overall customer profitability. This 
would not only secure the growth in revenue but would also increase the 
company's profit. 
The next chapter ('Concluding Management Recommendations'), while 
focusing on business development activities, continues listing prerequisites, 
which should be considered for a profitable and an efficient cross selling 
execution. 
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11 Concluding Management Recommendations 
The key concept of cross selling is to boost the total revenue and 
profit per customer by exhausting an existing relationship and by referring to 
available product and customer information shared through the company's 
database (Xavier and Shanthakumar 2000). 
Success through cross selling rests on a few key pillars. In 1988 
Sonnenberg had already defined a 'roadmap' of how to set up a successful 
cross selling program. Further scientists follow by extending the present 
recommendations and adding new ones to roll out cross selling accurately. In 
sum, we can cluster the managerial recommendations in six key pillars: mission 
statement of the management, CRM systems, quality of the sales force, 
customer relationship, industry focus and incentives. 
Firstly, as assumed in the model and highlighted by the research, the 
management has to initiate and declare cross selling as a 'megatrend' as well 
as a part of the corporate strategy (Sonnenberg 1988, Duclos et al. 2007, 
Gulati 2007). For example, at Wells Fargo, cross-sell imperatives are written 
into the overall corporate goals (Forbes Magazine 2012). The buy-in of the 
business unit is a prerequisite to execute cross selling. Also the results of the 
model underline that it is essential to write cross-sell imperatives into the 
overall corporate goals and thus to promote cross selling as a core value with 
clear focus on long-term goals in the marketplace more than its short-term 
results. This type of top-down approach is required for success. Secondly, the 
ability to track via CRM systems has to be present, and the system needs to 
have the necessary data and to be maintained (Kamakura et al. 2004). By 
revealing and identifying customer needs, analytics have a tremendous impact 
on cross selling success. Product and customer information such as contact 
details, demographics, sales history, lost orders, current transactions or 
preferences have to be stored and shared as well as embedded into the sales 
process (Ansari and Mela 2003). An enterprise-wide data warehouse offers 
business units entry to all needed information for their relations with customers 
and reduces the cost of information sharing between the business units. The 
sales force can leverage the data to make their starting situation more 
comfortable by initiating future engagements (Iyengar et al. 2003, Kamakura et 
al. 2003, Kamakura 2008, Marlin et al. 2001). Cross selling at its best depends 
on a forward-looking, even predictive technology. The third key pillar is the 
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quality of the sales force. Jarrar and Neely (2007) consider the CRM systems 
only as an enabler and conclude that strong ability and a high level of 
motivation in the sales force are the guarantee for successful selling. Finally, 
the individual negotiates with the customer and sell the company’s products 
and services. Therefore, it is highly recommended to educate the sales force by 
establishing a cross selling training program, which develops the skill set and 
technique within the business units to recognize cross selling opportunities 
(Duclos et al. 2007). The strategy must focus on how to serve the customer, 
not to act opportunistically by just selling the products or services of other 
business units without paying attention to adding value for their customers. A 
trained sales person expresses how the cross sold product or service would 
complement the original purchase and discloses the additional benefits. As has 
just been mentioned, the salesperson is directly in contact with the customer 
and so is the main person in charge of creating and enhancing the customer 
relationship and intimacy. This takes us to pillar four: customer relationship. 
Crosby et al. (1990) discovered that upcoming sales prospects depend most of 
the time on relationship quality. They also underline the importance of 
“relational selling behaviors' such as cooperative intentions, mutual disclosure, 
and intensive follow up contact”. These behaviors generate a solid and stable 
buyer-seller bond. Accordingly, sales departments have to be an integrated, 
cross-functional part of long-term customer management (Homburg et al. 
2000). The fifth key pillar is the 'industry focus'. To concentrate on the 
customer's industry, the sales force of a business unit should be divided in 
different groups where each group focuses on a single industry such as 
Industrials, Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG), High Tech, Pharmacy & 
Healthcare, Aerospace, Automotive, etc. The most compelling reasons to make 
the shift to industry-focused sales forces are that these salespersons 
understand the specific market and related needs of the customer as well as 
focusing on the customer pain points and be able to identify market trends in 
earlier stages. The sixth and most essential element is to have (monetary) 
incentives in place. To quote Sonnenberg (1988): “No effort is effective without 
offering the proper incentive to carry it out”. Business units and sales forces 
respectively are held accountable for their sales revenue. These six needed core 
elements to capitalize on cross selling are summarized in figure 17. 
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Thereby existing synergies could be used and even sustainable competitive 
advantages could be achieved. Through the efficient use of resources growth 
opportunities arise. In addition, the management creates a uniform incentive 
structure where it is no longer relevant which product is sold from which 
business unit. This structure facilitates the cross selling strategy and does not 
create any unintended barriers. These deliberations are clearly underlined by 
the model illustrated in Section A Iα∗ ' β∗ ' ?@Q. Coming back to our practical 
example, the industry champion of a logistics company sells sea freight to its 
customer if they ask for a cost-efficient solution and air freight if time-efficiency 
is required without being influenced by business unit set targets and partial 
incentives – in addition, the industry champion cross sells road freight for the 
last mile of transport. 
In conclusion, implementing and executing cross selling effectively 
and profitably are not easy ventures. Booster for best-in-class cross selling 
seems to be setting the right incentives. Still, the personality, working method 
and work habits of the key stakeholders (management and business unit's sales 
forces) are crucially important. Finally, cross selling is to be realized holistically. 
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